Abstract
In several papers, Hubert Dreyfus has used chess as a paradigmatic example of how experts act intuitively, rarely using deliberation when selecting actions, while individuals that are only competent rely on analytic and deliberative thought. By contrast, Montero and Evans (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10:175–194, 2011) argue that intuitive aspects of chess are actually rational, in the sense that actions can be justified. In this paper, I show that both Dreyfus’s and Montero and Evans’s views are too extreme, and that expertise in chess, and presumably in other domains, depends on a combination of intuitive thinking and deliberative search, both mediated by perceptual processes. There is more to expertise than just rational thought. I further contend that both sides ignore emotions, which are important in acquiring and maintaining expertise. Finally, I argue that experimental data and first-person data, which are sometimes presented as irreconcilable in the phenomenology literature, actually lead to similar conclusions.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Hubert Dreyfus and his brother Stuart have both contributed to this theory of expertise. However, to be consistent with M&E and given the recent exchange of papers on rationality and skill between H. Dreyfus and McDowell in Inquiry (Dreyfus 2007a, b; McDowell 2007a, b), and with apologies to Stuart Dreyfus, I will refer to this theory as (Hubert) Dreyfus’ theory.
It might be pointed out that not all phenomenologists agree with Dreyfus’s analysis. In particular, with respect to embodiment, Selinger (2008, p. 66) notes that “human interaction is, de facto, interaction between agents in culturally marked bodies.”
On p. 182, M&E write that “although grandmasters can usually beat international masters or weaker players without ever relying on anything beyond heuristics, it is times where specific heuristics are flouted which decide who wins in games between grandmasters.” I take exception with the first part of this statement. Without any look-ahead search, even a top grandmaster would risk losing against an international master or even a weaker player because of the risk of overlooking “cheap” tactics. In fact, M&E seem to agree with this conclusion in the paragraph that follows the quotation, where they write that “merely learning a grandmaster’s repertoire of heuristic rules may not turn a competent player into a grandmaster not because the grandmaster never relies on heuristic rules when deciding on a move, but rather because in addition to heuristic rules, calculating out the consequences of moves and intuition and [sic] plays a role.”
The example given by M&E (p. 186–187) does not do full justice to the amount of search carried out by strong players. Evans notes that “after carefully analyzing I discovered the winning sequence, reproduced below […].” Based on the extant scientific literature, it is likely that finding this winning sequence was no trivial matter and demanded extensive search in the jungle of possible moves and counter moves.
References
Beliavsky, A., & Mikhalchishin, A. (2002). Secrets of chess intuition. London: Gambit.
Benner, P. (1984). From novice to expert: excellence and power in clinical nursing practice (vol. 3). Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley.
Benner, P., Tanner, C., & Chesla, C. (1996). Expertise in nursing practice: caring, clinical judgment, and ethics. New York: Springer.
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008a). Expert and ‘novice’ problem solving strategies in chess—sixty years of citing de Groot (1946/1965/1978). Thinking and Reasoning, 14, 395–408.
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008b). Inflexibility of experts—reality or myth? Quantifying the Einstellung effect in chess masters. Cognitive Psychology, 56, 73–102.
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008c). Why good thoughts block better ones: the mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect. Cognition, 108, 652–661.
Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2009). Specialization effect and its influence on memory and problem solving in expert chess players. Cognitive Science, 33, 1117–1143.
Campitelli, G., & Gobet, F. (2004). Adaptive expert decision making: skilled chessplayers search more and deeper. Journal of the International Computer Games Association, 27, 209–216.
Campitelli, G., Gobet, F., Head, K., Buckley, M., & Parker, A. (2007). Brain localisation of memory chunks in chessplayers. International Journal of Neuroscience, 117, 1641–1659.
Chabris, C. F., & Hearst, E. S. (2003). Visualization, pattern recognition, and forward search: effects of playing speed and sight of the position on grandmaster chess errors. Cognitive Science, 27, 637–648.
Charness, N. (1981). Search in chess: age and skill differences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 7, 467–476.
Chassy, P., & Gobet, F. (2011). A hypothesis about the biological basis of expert intuition. Review of General Psychology, 15, 198–212.
Crandall, B., & Getchell-Reiter, K. (1993). Critical decision method: a technique for eliciting concrete assessment indicators from the “intuition” of NICU nurses. Advances in Nursing Science, 16, 42–51.
De Groot, A. D. (1965). Thought and choice in chess (first Dutch edition in 1946). The Hague: Mouton Publishers.
De Groot, A. D. (1986). Intuition in chess. Journal of the International Computer Chess Association, 9, 67–75.
De Groot, A. D. (1993). Intuition as a dispositional concept. In G. L. van Heck, P. Buoanito, J. J. Deary, & W. Nowack (Eds.), Personality psychology in Europe (vol. 4) (pp. 7–50). Tilburg: University Press.
De Groot, A. D., & Gobet, F. (1996). Perception and memory in chess. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2007a). Response to McDowell. Inquiry, 50, 371–377.
Dreyfus, H. L. (2007b). The return of myth of the mental. Inquiry, 50, 352–365.
Dreyfus, H. L., & Dreyfus, S. E. (1988). Mind over machine: the power of human intuition and expertise in the era of the computer (2nd ed.). New York: Free Press.
Dreyfus, H. L., & Dreyfus, S. E. (2005). Expertise in real world contexts. Organization Studies, 26, 779–792.
Fitts, P. M. (1964). Perceptual-motor skill learning. In A. Melton (Ed.), Categories of human learning (pp. 243–285). New York: Academic.
Freudenthal, D., Pine, J. M., Aguado-Orea, J., & Gobet, F. (2007). Modelling the developmental patterning of finiteness marking in English, Dutch, German and Spanish using MOSAIC. Cognitive Science, 31, 311–341.
Freudenthal, D., Pine, J. M., & Gobet, F. (2009). Simulating the referential properties of Dutch, German and English Root Infinitives in MOSAIC. Language Learning and Development, 5, 1–29.
Gobet, F. (1986a). D'indiscutables progrès dans les micro-ordinateurs d'échecs: Quand la machine se met à ruser. La Liberté, April 13.
Gobet, F. (1986b). Effets de l'incontrôlabilité sur la résolution de problèmes d'échecs [Effects of uncontrollability on chess problem solving]. Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
Gobet, F. (1997). A pattern-recognition theory of search in expert problem solving. Thinking and Reasoning, 3, 291–313.
Gobet, F. (1998). Chess thinking revisited. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 57, 18–32.
Gobet, F. (2009). Protocol analysis. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, & P. Wilken (Eds.), The Oxford companion to consciousness (pp. 538–540). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Gobet, F. (2011). Chunks and templates in semantic long-term memory: The importance of specialization. In J. Staszewski (Ed.), Expertise and skill acquisition: the impact of William G. Chase. New York, NY: Psychology Press (in press).
Gobet, F., & Chassy, P. (2008). Towards an alternative to Benner's theory of expert intuition in nursing: a discussion paper. International Journal of Nursing Studies, 45, 129–139.
Gobet, F., & Chassy, P. (2009). Expertise and intuition: a tale of three theories. Minds & Machines, 19, 151–180.
Gobet, F., & Retschitzki, J. (1991). Détresse apprise et jeu d'échecs: rôle de la familiarité et de la similitude des tâches. Revue Suisse de Psychologie, 20, 97–110.
Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A. (1996a). The roles of recognition processes and look-ahead search in time-constrained expert problem solving: evidence from grandmaster level chess. Psychological Science, 7, 52–55.
Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A. (1996b). Templates in chess memory: a mechanism for recalling several boards. Cognitive Psychology, 31, 1–40.
Gobet, F., & Simon, H. A. (1998). Pattern recognition makes search possible: comments on Holding (1992). Psychological Research, 61, 204–208.
Gobet, F., & Waters, A. J. (2003). The role of constraints in expert memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 1082–1094.
Gobet, F., de Voogt, A. J., & Retschitzki, J. (2004). Moves in mind. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Gobet, F., Chassy, P., & Bilalić, M. (2011). Foundations of cognitive psychology. Maidenhead, UK: McGraw Hill.
Holding, D. H. (1985). The psychology of chess skill. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Holding, D. H., & Pfau, H. D. (1985). Thinking ahead in chess. The American Journal of Psychology, 98, 271–282.
Johnson, J. G., & Raab, M. (2003). Take the first: option-generation and resulting choices. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91, 215–229.
Jones, G., Gobet, F., & Pine, J. M. (2007). Linking working memory and long-term memory: a computational model of the learning of new words. Developmental Science, 10, 853–873.
Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: a failure to disagree. American Psychologist, 64, 515–526.
Klein, G. A. (1998). Sources of power: how people make decisions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Klein, G. A. (2003). Intuition at work. New York, NY: Currency Doubleday.
Klein, G. A., Wolf, S., Militello, L., & Zsambok, C. (1995). Characteristics of skilled option generation in chess. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 62, 63–69.
Larkin, J. H., McDermott, J., Simon, D. P., & Simon, H. A. (1980). Expert and novice performance in solving physics problems. Science, 208, 1335–1342.
Marewski, J. N., Gaissmaier, W., & Gigerenzer, G. (2010). Good judgments do not require complex cognition. Cognitive Processing, 11, 103–121.
McCormack, B. (1993). Intuition: concept analysis and application to curriculum development. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 2, 11–17.
McCutcheon, H. H. I., & Pincombe, J. (2001). Intuition: an important tool in the practice of nursing. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 35, 342–348.
McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, J. (2007a). Response to Dreyfus. Inquiry, 50, 366–370.
McDowell, J. (2007b). What myth? Inquiry, 50, 338–351.
Montero, B., & Evans, C. D. A. (2011). Intuitions without concepts lose the game: mindedness in the art of chess. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10, 175–194.
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we know: verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 231–259.
O'Kelly de Galway, A. (1963). Pétrossian, l'intuition à l'affût [Petrossian, intuition on the lookout]. Madrid: Castilla.
Patton, J. R. (2003). Intuition in decisions. Management Decision, 41, 989–996.
Prietula, M. J., & Simon, H. A. (1989). The experts in your midst. Harvard Business Review, Jan–Feb. pp 120–124.
Richman, H. B., Gobet, F., Staszewski, J. J., & Simon, H. A. (1996). Perceptual and memory processes in the acquisition of expert performance: the EPAM model. In K. A. Ericsson (Ed.), The road to excellence (pp. 167–187). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Robbins, T. W., Anderson, E. J., Barker, D. R., Bradley, A. C., Fearnyhough, C., Henson, R., et al. (1996). Working memory in chess. Memory and Cognition, 24, 83–93.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes & Noble.
Saariluoma, P. (1992). Visuospatial and articulatory interference in chess players' information intake. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6, 77–89.
Saariluoma, P. (1995). Chess players' thinking: a cognitive psychological approach. London: Routledge.
Selinger, E. (2008). Chess-playing computers and embodied grandmasters: in what ways does the difference matter? In B. Hale (Ed.), Philosophy looks at chess (pp. 65–87). Chicago: Open Court Press.
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of bounded rationality: behavioral economics and business organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Simon, H. A. (1995). Explaining the ineffable: AI on the topics of intuition, insight and inspiration. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 939–948).
Simon, H. A., & Chase, W. G. (1973). Skill in chess. American Scientist, 61, 393–403.
Tal, M. (1997). The life and games of Mikhail Tal. London: Everyman Chess.
Tamburelli, M., Jones, G., Gobet, F., & Pine, J. M. (2011). Computational modelling of phonological acquisition: simulating error patterns in nonword repetition tasks. Language and Cognitive Processes (in press).
Tikhomirov, O. K., & Vinogradov, Y. E. (1970). Emotions in the heuristic function. Soviet Psychology, 8, 198–203.
Wan, X. H., Nakatani, H., Ueno, K., Asamizuya, T., Cheng, K., & Tanaka, K. (2011). The neural basis of intuitive best next-move generation in board game experts. Science, 331, 341–346.
Acknowledgments
Yvan Russell and two anonymous reviewers made useful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. Fernand Gobet was supported by a Research Fellowship from the UK Economic and Social Research Council.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gobet, F. Concepts without intuition lose the game: commentary on Montero and Evans (2011). Phenom Cogn Sci 11, 237–250 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9246-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9246-7