Journal of the History of Philosophy

BOOK REVIEWS 87 Rationalism in Greek Philosophy. By George Boas. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Pp. xii + 488. $7.50.) This is an interesting and provocative work. It is not, as Boas warns his readers, a history of Greek philosophy in general. It is concerned, rather, with several large topics which the author uses to explicate the general theme of Greek rationalism. The topics chosen are: the distinction between appearance and reality, the methods used to draw this distinction, the conception of human life, and ethics. The treatment of these topics, so central and important in the history of Greek thought, results in a work of very considerable scope. In temporal span also the work is substantial, for it studies and interprets these selected topics from the Pre-Socratics through the Neo-Platonists. The work is complex. Each chapter undertakes to resolve controversial questions both of textual and philosophical criticism. Boas's judgment in these matters is often insightful, always fresh and stimulating. In a difficult and compressed Preface, Boas explains what he understands by rationalism . Rationalism is described as a "systematic study" of accepted premises, which means, in part, the testing of the implications of accepted premises for logical consistency. A premise is, ideally, a generalization from experience, for "... general laws . . . are wanted in science and philosophy" (p. vii). But premises may sometimes be derivative from such sources as common sense or intuition. Whatever their source, premises and their implications must run the test of consistency and, in addition provide a "... verifiable account of an important set of facts" (p. x). Quite apart from the troubling remark about "general laws," two elements are mentioned in the Preface which constitute what Boas intends by "rationalism." One wonders at the beginning bow these methodological criteria will serve in the interpretation of Greek rationalism. Boas, in practice, uses a much more generous conception of rationalism as a method than that proposed in the Pre[ace.Sometimes rationalism stands for the appeal to reason or experience or both in contrast to the appeal to authority and revelation. It is toward the end of the book that one finds perhaps the best statement of rationalism as a method which has guided this study. Professor Boas writes, reflecting back on the course ol Greek thought: We know too little about the Milesians and the Pythagoreans to say more than that they translated the ancient myths of cosmic birth and decay into rational language. But when we come to the figures of lteraclitus, Parmenides, and Democritus, we meet with that independence of mind which seems to us characteristic of the great scientific investigators. The double role of reason, that of criticism and that of construction, was played wholeheartedly by them, and apparently the mere fact that a belief was traditional did not give it special plausibility. The same may be said of both Plato and Aristotle (p. ~54). It dearly requires some conception such as this, in contrast to that of the Preface, to understand, on the methodological side, Boas's strong claims that Plato and Aristotle are "... the greatest rationalists in the history of philosophy . . ." and that Plato is the "major defender of rationalism" (p. 128). One needs, however, much more than just the commitment of the "double role of reason" to understand these claims about Plato and Aristotle. Rationalism is also used to denote a number of philosophical doctrines, some of which Plato and Aristotle shared in common. It is carefully argued, for instance, that both Plato and Aristotle are committed to the epistemological view that reason alone is the source of knowledge in the strict sense, a doctrine, which in the case of Aristotle, is sometimes obscured. To this 88 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY basic feature of rationalism Boas adds the following: "The inability, or perhap the unwillingness, to conceive of anything transient as real is at the heart of the rationalist tradition . . ." (p. 184). It is this notion of rationalism as certain substantive philosophical doctrines which often dominates Boas's account of this central theme in the history of Greek thought. It becomes especially clear in an interesting chapter on Aristotle that it is adherence to certain philosophical doctrines rather than adherence...