Abstract
While Process Reliabilism has long been regarded by many as a version of Foundationalism, this paper argues that there is a version of Process Reliabilism that can also been seen as at least a partial vindication of Coherentism as well. The significance of this result lies in what it tells us both about the prospects for a plausible Process Reliabilism, but also about the old-school debate between Foundationalists and Coherentists.
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Notes
This is a Process Reliabilist version of reliabilism. An adequate reliabilist theory of this sort will have to be modified to handle defeaters, but as this is not my topic I will work with a simple reliabilism.
Interestingly, Goldman himself does not advance Reliabilism in this way, either in his 1979 or in his 1986. This said, the idea that reliabilism might be seen as a version of foundationalism has a long pedigree; most recently it is developed at length in Lyons (2009).
This is not to say that the reliabilist has no account of non-basic beliefs. On the contrary, there have been reliabilist accounts of nonbasic beliefs: Goldman (1986) is probably the most familiar. He accounts for the epistemology of nonbasic beliefs by distinguishing between belief-dependent and belief-independent processes of belief-formation, with the former being coextensive with the category of nonbasic belief. My point is rather that reliabilism was developed in the first instance with the epistemology of basic beliefs, in particular perceptual beliefs, in mind.
As we will see, however, a version of reliabilism incorporating many of the elements suggested below was presented in Bach (1984) and (1985). However, for reasons that I will explore below, Bach’s brand of reliabilism is developed around his account of a certain sort of reasoning—default reasoning—and in this respect his account of the epistemology of basic belief will differ in some important ways from the account developed here, in ways to be explored below. It is also worth noting that Harman (1973, 1980), whose account of the Gettier Problem Bach aims to defend, explicitly endorses elements of (explanatory) coherence into his epistemology; but for his part he does not endorse any version of reliabilism. In a way, then, the present position can be seen as attempting to honor both sorts of insight in the Bach-Harman position: recognizing (with Bach) the centrality of reliabilist considerations to justification, while at the same time acknowledging (with Harman) that coherence considerations play a crucial (and ineliminable) role in epistemology.
I borrow the notion of a ‘filter’ from Audi (1997). It is worth noting that an early version of this idea can be seen in Kent Bach’s claim (1984: 45) that, when it comes to those belief-forming processes involving “default reasoning,” human beings are “equipped with backup processes for detecting when the conditions presupposed by” the reliability of such processes “is not met” (italics added). Since these processes operate below the level of conscious awareness (on Bach’s theory), they operate in a manner much like the “filter” Audi mentions. I will return to Bach’s account below, in the main body of the text.
In cases of this sort, where the natural tendency to form (or sustain) belief is interrupted, the subject then brings the resources of conscious attention to the matter at hand—with the result that even if she forms or sustains a belief in such cases, the belief in question is not psychologically basic, but instead involves conscious reasoning.
I borrow the notion of a ‘filter’ from Audi (1997). It is worth noting that an early version of this idea can be seen in Kent Bach’s claim (1984: 45) that, when it comes to those belief-forming processes involving “default reasoning,” human beings are “equipped with backup processes for detecting when the conditions presupposed by” the reliability of such processes “is not met” (italics added). Since these processes operate below the level of conscious awareness (on Bach’s theory), they operate in a manner much like the “filter” Audi mentions. I will return to Bach’s account below, in the main body of the text.
This position regards the sources as a faculty in the hearer through which the hearer recovers the proposition asserted. An alternative view, which in some ways is more radical but in others more plausible, would be to regard the source as the speaker herself. I will not explore this further here.
It is Bach’s view that this is indeed an inference. I will discuss this below.
Or, as Goldman (1986) might say, ‘conditionally reliable.’ For Goldman (1986), a process is conditionally reliable just in case it is reliable—produces a preponderance of true belief over false belief—when its inputs are true. It is this notion that Goldman uses to account for the justification of nonbasic beliefs. Bach himself acknowledges this point.
For this point see also Bach (1985: 258–59).
These are Bach’s own examples of beliefs formed through processes involving default reasoning, and he repeats them in both his 1984 and 1985.
I acknowledge that this would mean that we need an alternative approach to the Gettier Problem. So be it.
Here I agree with Bach, against Harman.
Is there a worry that the coherentist element in RFC’s picture undermines my claim that RFC treats certain beliefs as epistemically basic? No. On the present proposal, the fact that a belief coheres with the rest of the subject’s doxastic system is not itself what makes for doxastic justification; only reliability makes for doxastic justification.
It goes without saying, of course, that if the filter is not good—if it weeds out many more truths than falsehoods—it can adversely affect the reliability of the whole process. Still, I assume that as a matter of psychological fact, this is not the case. In this particular I am agreeing with Bach, who notes his assumption that as a matter of fact we are reliable in this respect (1984: 44).
Compare Bach’s discussion (1984: 46–48, 51–53) of the frame problem.
This is a theme in a good deal of the work of Ernie Sosa.
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Goldberg, S. A Reliabilist Foundationalist Coherentism. Erkenn 77, 187–196 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9347-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9347-2