Abstract
This paper addresses one aspect of the natural law theory of Germain Grisez. According to Grisez, practical reason identifies the goods of human life prior to the invocation of any moral or normative notions. It can thus provide a non-normative foundation for moral theory. I present Grisez’s position and argue that the apparently non-normative aspect of natural law cannot support the moral position built upon it. I argue, in particular, that practical principles, as Grisez understands them, are best understood as speech acts. If this is correct, it is possible to develop a sceptical challenge to Grisez’s position.
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I am grateful to Michael Frede, Robert George, Richard Holton, Philip Pettit, and two anonymous reviewers for many helpful comments on this paper. This paper was presented at a seminar in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University in November 1987, and I am grateful for the comments I received from the audience—in particular, Germain Grisez—on that occasion.
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Gold, I. Does natural law have non-normative foundations?. SOPHIA 41, 1–17 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780399
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780399