Abstract
In this paper I argue that RadicalInterpretation (RI), taken to be a methodological doctrine regarding the conditions under which an interpretation of an utterance is both warranted and correct, has unacceptable implications for the conditions on (ascriptions of) understanding. The notion of understanding at play is that which underwrites the testimonial transmission of knowledge. After developing this notion I argue that, on the assumption of RI, hearers will fail to have such understanding in situations in which we should want to maintain otherwise. The overall effect of the argument is to provide a heretofore unexamined source of motivation for anti-individualistic approaches to the semantics of utterances.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Adler, J.: 1994, 'Testimony, Trust, Knowing', Journal of Philosophy 91, 264‐275.
Audi, R.: 1997, 'The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification', American Philosophical Quarterly 34(4), 405‐422.
Burge, T.: 1979, 'Individualism and the Mental', Midwest Studies 4, 73‐121.
Burge, T.: 1989, 'Wherein is Language Social?', in A. George (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky, Blackwell, Oxford.
Burge, T.: 1993, 'Content Preservation', Philosophical Review 102(4), 457‐488.
Burge, T.: 1997, 'Interlocution, Perception, and Memory', Philosophical Studies 86, 21‐ 47.
Coady, C. A. J.: 1992, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Davidson, D.: 1967, 'Truth and Meaning', Synthese 17, 304‐323. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, D.: 1969, 'On Saying That', in D. Davidson, J. Hintikka, and D. Reidel (eds.), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine, pp. 148‐174. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, D.: 1973, 'Radical Interpretation', Dialectica 27, 313‐328. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, D.: 1974a, 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', Synthese 27, 309‐323. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, D.: 1974b, 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, D.: 1975, 'Thought and Talk', in S. Guttenplan (ed.), In Mind and Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, D.: 1979, 'The Inscrutability of Reference', Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10, 7‐19. Reprinted in Davidson (1984).
Davidson, D.: 1984, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Davidson, D.: 1986, 'Nice Derangement of Epitaphs', in E. Lepore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 433‐446.
Davidson, D.: 1986a, 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', in E. Lepore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 307‐319.
Davidson, D.: 1987, 'Knowing One's Own Mind', Reprinted in Davidson (2001).
Davidson, D.: 2001, Subjective Intersubiective Objective, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Ebbs, ?.: 1997: 'Can We Take Our Words at Face Value?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, 3.
Fricker, E.: 1987, 'The Epistemology of Testimony', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Vol. 61, pp. 57‐83.
Fricker, E.: 1994, 'Against Gullibility', in B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti (eds.), Knowing from Words, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 125‐161.
Fricker, F.: 1995, 'Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony', Mind 104, 393‐411.
Goldberg, S.: 2001, 'Testimonially Based Knowledge from False Testimony', Philosophical Quarterly 51, 512‐526.
Goldberg, S.: 2002a, 'Speech Reports and the Epistemology of Testimony', Protosociology 17, 57‐75.
Goldberg, S.: 2002b, 'Do Anti-Individualistic Construals of the Attitudes Capture the Agent's Conceptions?', Noûs 36, 597‐621.
Graham, P.: 1999, 'Transferring Knowledge', Nous 34, 131‐152.
Hardwig, J.: 1991, 'The Role of Trust in Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 88, 693‐708.
Insole, C.: 2000, 'Seeing Off the Local Threat to Irreducible Knowledge by Testimony', Philosophical Quarterly 50(198), 44‐56.
Lackey, J.: 1999, 'Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission', The Philosophical Quarterly 49(197), 471‐490.
Lyons, J.: 1997, 'Testimony, Induction, and Folk Psychology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75(2), 163‐177.
McDowell, J.: 1994, 'Knowledge by Hearsay', Reprinted in J. McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
Stevenson, F.: 1993, 'Why Believe What People Say?', Synthese 94, 429‐451.
Webb, M. O.: 1993, 'Why I Know about as Much as You: A Reply to Hardwig', Journal of Philosophy 90, 260‐270.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Goldberg, S.C. Radical Interpretation, Understanding, and the Testimonial Transmission of Knowledge. Synthese 138, 387–416 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000016423.39916.ad
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000016423.39916.ad