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What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology

  • S.I. : Social Epistemology
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to articulate and defend a particular role for ethico-political values in social epistemology research. I begin by describing a research programme in social epistemology—one which I have introduced and defended elsewhere. I go on to argue that by the lights of this research programme, there is an important role to be played by ethico-political values in knowledge communities, and (correspondingly) an important role in social epistemological research in describing the values inhering in particular knowledge communities. I conclude by noting how, even as it expands its focus beyond the traditional one to include descriptions of our “knowledge practices,” this sort of project relates to some of the core questions that have been pursued by traditional epistemology.

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Notes

  1. See Fuller (1988, 2012).

  2. For reasons that I hope will become clear as my argument proceeds, I regard both labels (‘critical social epistemology’ and ‘analytic social epistemology’) as unfortunate.

  3. See Goldman (1999, 2001, 2002, 2004).

  4. See e.g. Goldberg (2013, 2015a, 2017a).

  5. The emphasis on agency is also a characteristic of various forms of feminist epistemology; see especially Code (1991), Jaggar (1983), Nelson (1990) and Scheman (1995).

  6. This is a main theme of Goldberg (2015b, 2018).

  7. See e.g. Anderson (2012), Dotson (2011a, b, 2014), Maitra (2010), Marsh (2011), Hinchman (2005), McMyler (2011), Moran (2006), Wanderer (2011) and Goldberg (2017a).

  8. See Gibbons (2006), who discusses the epistemic significance of a case of this sort.

  9. What I have had to say is presented in Goldberg (2016, 2017b).

  10. I borrow this term from Lackey (1999).

  11. Several come to mind. For early versions [in addition to Pollock (1986)] see Harman (1973: pp. 143–144) and Kornblith (1983: p. 36). For more recent writers who employ the notion, see Lackey (1999, 2005, 2006, 2011, 2014), Meeker (2004: pp. 162–163), Reed (2006), Bernecker (2008), Lyons (2011) and Record (2013: p. 3).

  12. With thanks to Kathryn Pogin for a helpful conversation on this topic.

  13. Indeed, I would argue for a stronger conclusion: failing to have evidence one ought to have had can defeat one’s justification. This is a point that was endorsed as early as Kornblith (1983), but also most of the others cited in footnote 12 above. For my own defense of this view, see Goldberg (2017b, 2018).

  14. This assumes that members of the community can reliably discern when E is making statements within her expertise. This assumption is not always warranted, of course.

  15. Here I should add the qualification: absent some reason to do so.

  16. Here I should add the qualification: in which she lacks such reason.

  17. A large literature in feminist epistemology addresses this point. See e.g. Alcoff (2001), Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), Bleier (1984), Code (1981, 1991), Grasswick (2013), Grasswick and Webb (2002), Keller (1985), Jones (2002), Longino (1990, 1999), Rolin (2002), Scheman (1995), Tuana (1995) and Wylie (2003, 2011).

  18. See e.g. Collins (1990), Dotson (2011b, 2014), Haslanger (2014), and Mills (1997, 2007).

  19. I raised this issue in Goldberg (2016, 2017b, 2018).

  20. Whether this risk materializes will depend on one’s theory of normative defeat. According to some theories, the very fact that there is further evidence (or knowledge) one should have had itself defeats one’s justification. According to others, it is not this fact, but the epistemic bearing of the evidence (or knowledge) in question, that defeats—in which case one’s justification is defeated only if the evidence one should have had bears against one’s belief. I will be neutral on this here.

  21. With thanks to Leandro de Brasi for a helpful discussion of this point.

  22. For a part of the story, see Goldberg (2010, 2015a, 2018).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 60208, USA

    Sanford C. Goldberg

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Correspondence to Sanford C. Goldberg.

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With thanks to Leandro de Brasi, Francisco Periera Gandarias, and Kathryn Pogin for helpful discussions of related matters.

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Goldberg, S.C. What we owe each other, epistemologically speaking: ethico-political values in social epistemology. Synthese 197, 4407–4423 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01928-6

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