Abstract
An analysis of the role of language in basic and applied science from the semantics of science and the theory of reference requires several steps. First, to specify the field of analysis in the light of several factors: (a) the semantic problems of science; (b) the reference in its triple dimension of relation between language and reality, of referent and of transmission in science; and (c) the link between meaning and reference in science.
Second, to consider the central approach to the semantics of science, which forks into two main directions: (i) the semantic line and (ii) the pragmatic path. De facto, they lead to different interpretations of the role of language in basic science and in applied science. The semantic line focuses on the content expressed through terms, statements and theories, which has been influential in important philosophical trends and still is prominent in some versions of scientific realism. Meanwhile, the pragmatic path emphasizes the meaning as use, which has influenced philosophers of science of diverse tendencies, such as S. Toulmin, Th. Kuhn (with projection in science, technology and society studies), American pragmatists and supporters of the methodological pluralism.
Third, to make explicit the leading conceptions regarding the theory of reference, both for the formal sciences and for the empirical sciences. There are a number of options, four of which are analyzed here. (I) The view associated with the semantic role (the reference as a relation between the term and the object designated) and the semantic value (the reference as a reality designated by the term used), which connects semantic, epistemological and ontological realms in basic science and in applied science. (II) The causal theory of reference, which has shifted towards internal realism. (III) Anti-realistic semantics, where truth is replaced by proof (or “justified assertion”) and the reference is the use made by someone of a term in a context. (IV) Kuhn’s approach in his linguistic period, where he rethinks the scientific revolutions taking into account the causal theory of reference.
Fourth, to be aware of the consequences of these analyses for basic science and applied science in two ways: on the one hand, for the semantic differences between them, and, on the other, for the perspective of reference.
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Notes
- 1.
Language is a universal capacity that is expressed through many different codes, so language can never be intrinsically private. This is also the case of science, which is also a human capacity open to all and which cannot be purely individual. The horizon of the semantics of science moves in these coordinates, which advance on the basis of cooperation, just like science as a whole, where values play a role. Cf. Rolin (2015).
- 2.
Issues of theory of meaning related to science configure only a part of the questions that are philosophically relevant to scientific language, as can be seen in this book. See, in this regard, Gonzalez (2021).
- 3.
These constitutive elements are the basis on which the topics are then discussed, which are in relation to issues such as objectivity, autonomy, critical attitude or progress of science. On these four aspects in contemporary science, see Niiniluoto (1984, 4–7).
- 4.
The relationships between these parts of the philosophy and methodology of science and the philosophy of technology are addressed in Gonzalez (2013a).
- 5.
This social dimension of science is addressed by the external perspective of the philosophy of science. Its link with the issues raised by technology is clear. Cf. Gonzalez (2005).
- 6.
For several decades, the emphasis on the semantics of science has been associated with approaches related to formal language, since obviously formal language needs interpretation that gives it a semantic content. The perspective of analysis here is much broader than that view.
- 7.
These three thematic levels of science — general, group and particular — in terms of scientific prediction are expressly addressed in the book Gonzalez (2015).
- 8.
The relevance of context is highlighted in philosophical-methodological trends such as pragmatism, which can approach the issue from “inside” to “outside,” emphasizing the intentionality in the use of language, or from “outside” to “inside,” which insists on the role of the environment around of the language used. A complete semantic analysis of the issue requires both the “inside” and the “outside” perspectives.
- 9.
- 10.
These three possibilities, in the case of scientific prediction, are considered in Gonzalez (2015, 32–40).
- 11.
Those four thematic spheres are in Peter F. Strawson. A comparison between his conception and the positions of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Willard van Orman Quine is developed in Gonzalez (1986a).
The publications of these five philosophers and the works published about them are collected in Gonzalez (1986b). Within analytical philosophy, these publications address the theory of reference in relation to the theory of meaning, logical-linguistic aspects, the theory of knowledge and metaphysics.
- 12.
“Reference, for Frege, is a notion required in the theory of meaning — in the general account of how language functions — just as the notion of truth is required: but the reference of a term is no more part of what is ordinarily understood as its meaning than the truth-value of a sentence is” (Dummett 1981a, 84).
- 13.
Cf. Hacking’s chapter “Reference” in his book Representing and Intervening, especially, 75–76.
- 14.
See also Hacking, I., “Reference,” in Hacking (1983 [2005], 75–91).
- 15.
Chomsky connects his universal grammar with semantic criteria, cf. Chomsky (1972). He also suggested that pragmatic competence could be a cognitive system different from grammatical competence and endowed with a different structure, cf. Chomsky (1980). Chomsky has dealt with other topics on language that have unquestionable philosophical relevance, cf. Chomsky (1993), where he discusses his vision with other experts, and Chomsky (1995).
- 16.
He recognizes that the holders of one view “share some ground with their opponents” (Strawson [1970] 1971b, 176).
- 17.
An alternative version is the approach from the concept of “denotation,” instead of “reference.” This is a clearly different notion, which is why Peter Geach discarded it in order to translate Bedeutung in the case of Frege’s approach. Cf. Geach, P. T. ([1958–59] 1970, 209, note).
- 18.
- 19.
According to Moulines, Frege’s semantic scheme is still the best tool for analysis at our disposal. Cf. Moulines (1982, 331). However, when he studies Frege’s position in favor of truth as the main goal of science, Moulines is critical and in favor of the thesis of methodological instrumentalism. See Moulines (1990).
- 20.
The publications of the first decades are collected in Diederich et al. (1989).
- 21.
On how this structuralist conception characterizes the unity of science, see in Echeverria (1990).
- 22.
- 23.
“Knowing what a word means is knowing how to use it for communication with other members of the language community within which it is current. But that ability does not imply that one knows something that attaches to the word by itself — its meaning, say, or its semantic markers. With occasional exceptions, words do not have meanings individually, but only through their associations with other words within a semantic field. If the use of an individual term changes, then the use of the terms associated with it normally changes as well” (Kuhn 1990, 301).
- 24.
Late Wittgenstein has an impact on several passages of the book, being one of the most cited authors: Toulmin (1953 [1957], 13–14, 51, 81, 88–89, 129, 162–163 and 172).
- 25.
In Kuhn the paradigm shift entails a change of meaning, which affects the question of incommensurability; cf. Kuhn (1962 [1970], 102).
- 26.
- 27.
Quite interesting is the recognition that Kuhn made in this third period on ‘could one play chess without the queen?’: “Twenty-five years ago the quotation was a standard part of what I now discover was a merely oral tradition. Though clearly ‘Wittgensteinian,’ it is not to be found in any of Wittgenstein’s published writings. I preserve it here because of its recurrent role in my philosophical development and because I’ve found no published substitute that so clearly prohibits the response that the question might be answerable if only there were more information” (Kuhn 1990, 316–317, note 15).
- 28.
“I am among those who have found the claims of the strong program absurd: an example of deconstruction gone mad” (Kuhn [1991b] 2000d, 110).
- 29.
A development of these reasons can be found in Gonzalez (2020c).
- 30.
On the issue of the “formal” and “nonformal” conditions for reductions in science, see the influential analysis made in Nagel (1961, 354–366). This double set of conditions can be used to consider the philosophico-methodological costs of the reduction.
- 31.
These two aspects are dealt with by Dummett (1981a, 210–211).
- 32.
“Causal insofar as it explains a person’s use of a term with a certain reference in terms of a causal nexus between this use and earlier uses of that term with that reference” Kroon (1985, 143).
- 33.
In the case of the application of science, we can add other types of statements of a more contextual type, as happens in medicine with preventive statements in individualized therapy.
- 34.
In addition to Michael Dummett, with different nuances, other specialists adhere to Frege’s realistic interpretation: Ignacio Angelelli, Gregory Currie, Richard Eldridge, Peter Geach and Michael Resnik, thus discarding the vision of Hans Sluga. See Gonzalez (1986a, 25–40; especially, 25–27).
- 35.
It should be noted that, for Dummett, practical knowledge and knowledge of language have relevant differences. Cf. Dummett, M. (1978d).
- 36.
“In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world” (Kuhn 1962 [1970], 111).
- 37.
This view is criticized in Resnik (1987).
- 38.
This lecture took place on 23 February 1976, the year of the shift towards “internal realism,” which was completed months later, in the lecture given on 29 December 1976: Putnam (1978a).
- 39.
This chapter has its origin in a 1982 text by Putnam, dedicated to two realists, which was revised for publication in the 1990 volume.
- 40.
In addition, Putnam addresses “Kant’s problem, the problem of explaining the referential connection between our ‘representations’ and the world” where he criticizes Jerry Fodor’s approach. See Putnam (1992, ch. 3, 35–59).
- 41.
Although internal realism has left its mark, insofar as it has favored aspects such as pluralism in the analysis of science, it does not play a leading role in current trends in scientific realism. See, in this regard, Gonzalez (2006, 1–23).
- 42.
“I basically agree with Putnam’s views on metaphysical realism” (Tuomela 1979, 124).
- 43.
In addition to the above-mentioned publications, it is worth noting Dummett (1991).
- 44.
On this issue, see Gonzalez (1991a).
- 45.
- 46.
Scientific realism, in general, and semantic realism, in particular, have various expressions today. In this regard, objectivity is more important than truth, cf. Gonzalez (2020a).
- 47.
On the choice between “truth” and “justifiability” and the shortcomings of the anti-realist approach in this respect, see Gonzalez (1990a, 159–162 and 169–170).
- 48.
The characterization of “local incommensurability” appears in Kuhn ([1983] 2000a, 35–37).
- 49.
“It is needed (…) to defend notions like truth and knowledge from, for example, the excesses of postmodernist movements like the strong program” (Kuhn [1991a] 2000c, 91).
- 50.
“The position I’m developing is a sort of post-Darwinian Kantianism. Like the Kantian categories, the lexicon supplies preconditions of possible experience. But lexical categories, unlike their Kantian forebears, can and do change, both with time and the passage from one community to another” (Kuhn [1991a] 2000c, 104).
- 51.
Evolutionism inspired by Ch. Darwin and historicity, understood in the strict sense, are not the same. On the notion of “historicity,” cf. Gonzalez (2011).
- 52.
Acknowledging Kuhn that he defends the existence of Kantian Ding an sich in “The Road since Structure,” the co-editors expressly point out: “Kuhn had earlier rejected the notion of a Ding an sich (see essay 8 [“Metaphor in Science,” 1979]), and he again later repudiated (in conversations with us) both that notion and the reasons he had put forward for it” (Conant and Haugeland 2000, 7).
- 53.
“Putnam has (…) moving (…) to a view (“internal realism”) with significant parallels to my own” (Kuhn 1990, 317, note 23).
- 54.
This issue has been analyzed by Dummett among others. See Dummett (1981b).
- 55.
The next step — if we analyze it in terms of the configuration of theories with an ontological component — leads to how to approach the identity of these objects or processes — and therefore also their diversity — in two dimensions: the structural and the dynamic. Concerning the first, several philosophical-methodological viewpoints come into play, among which is ontological structural realism. See, in this respect, Ladyman (2007, especially, 23). Regarding the second — identity and diversity from a dynamic perspective — see Gonzalez (2013c).
- 56.
- 57.
This is what happens with the notion of truth as redundancy, where — according to Peter Strawson — the idea of correspondence is presupposed when dealing with redundancy: “One who makes a statement or assertion makes a true statement if and only if things are as, in making that statement, he states to be” (Strawson [1970] 1971b), 180). Meanwhile, truth as redundancy is also present — in my judgment — in the vision of mathematics in the late period of Wittgenstein. Cf. Gonzalez (1987).
- 58.
It seems odd to claim that “the epithet ‘intelligible’ applies to theories, not to phenomena” (de Regt 2017, 12). The same idea can be found in pages 45 and 88.
- 59.
On the issue of the incompleteness of the reference, see De Groot (1987, 632–633 note).
- 60.
See, in this regard, Strawson’s comments on when the objective reference emerge. They are made in his criticism to Quine’s views. Cf. Strawson (1986, 519–532; especially, 521–531).
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This paper has been developed within the framework of the project FFI2016-79728-P, supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (AEI).
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Gonzalez, W.J. (2021). Semantics of Science and Theory of Reference: An Analysis of the Role of Language in Basic Science and Applied Science. In: Gonzalez, W.J. (eds) Language and Scientific Research. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-60537-7_2
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