Abstract
This paper aims to identify several interpretive problems posed by the final part of DA II.11 (423b27–424 a10), where Aristotle intertwines the thesis that a sense is like a ‘mean’ and an explanation for the existence of a ‘blind spot’ related to the sense of touch, adding the further contention that we are capable of discriminating because the mean ‘becomes the other opposite’ in relation to the perceptible property being perceived. To solve those problems, the paper explores a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s claims, arguing that they describe a homeostatic physiological reaction by which the sensory apparatus responds to perceptible stimuli. According to the proposed interpretation, such homeostatic reaction constitutes a necessary condition for perceiving what Aristotle refers to as ‘proper’ perceptible features, which include properties like ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ as well as colors and sounds.
Funding statement: This work was supported by the Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo, (http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001807, Grant Number: 2016/02485-0).
References
Ackrill, J.L. 1981. Aristotle the Philosopher, 1 ed. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Bolton, R. 2005. “Perception Naturalized in Aristotle’s De Anima.” In Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, edited by R. Salles. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Bradshaw, D. 1997. “Aristotle on Perception: The Dual-Logos Theory.” Apeiron 30 (2): 143–61.10.1515/APEIRON.1997.30.2.143Search in Google Scholar
Broadie, S. 1991. Ethics with Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Burnyeat, M. 1992. “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A Draft).” In Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited by M.C. Nussbaum, and A.O. Rorty, 15–26. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/019823600X.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Burnyeat, M. 1995. “How Much Happens When Aristotle Sees Red and Hears Middle C? Remarks on De Anima 2. 7-8.” In Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited by M.C. Nussbaum, and A.O. Rorty, 421–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Caston, V. 2004. “The Spirit and the Letter: Aristotle on Perception.” In Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, edited by R. Salles, 245–320. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Cohen, S.M. 1992. “Hylomorphism and Functionalism.” In Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited by M.C. Nussbaum, and A.O. Rorty, 57–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/019823600X.003.0005Search in Google Scholar
Corcilius, K. 2014. “Activity, Passivity, and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle.” In Active Perception in the History of Philosophy, 31–53. New York: Springer.10.1007/978-3-319-04361-6_3Search in Google Scholar
Ducharme, A. 2014. “Aristotle’s Mark of Sentience.” Apeiron 47 (3): 293–309.10.1515/apeiron-2013-0027Search in Google Scholar
Ebert, T. 1983. “Aristotle on What Is Done in Perceiving.” Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37 (2): 181–98.Search in Google Scholar
Everson, S. 1997. Aristotle on Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Freeland, C. 1992. “Aristotle on the Sense of Touch.” In Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited by M.C. Nussbaum, and A.O. Rorty, 227–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/019823600X.003.0014Search in Google Scholar
Grasso, R. 2013. “Receiving Forms without the Matter in Aristotle’s DA II.12.” Philosophical Inquiry 36 (1–2): 23–44.10.5840/philinquiry2013371/29Search in Google Scholar
Gregoric, P. 2007. Aristotle on the Common Sense. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199277377.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Hicks, R.D. 1907. Aristotle De Anima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Hursthouse, R. 1980 “A False Doctrine of the Mean.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 57–72.10.1093/aristotelian/81.1.57Search in Google Scholar
Hursthouse, R. 2006. “The Central Doctrine of the Mean.” In The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, edited by R. Kraut, 96–115. Oxford: Blackwell.10.1002/9780470776513.ch4Search in Google Scholar
Johansen, T.K. 1997. Aristotle on the Sense-Organs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511518461Search in Google Scholar
Johansen, T.K. 2002. “Imprinted on the Mind: Active and Passive in Aristotle’s Theory of Sense Perception.” In Theories, Technologies, Instrumentalities of Color: Anthropological and Historiographic Perspectives, edited by B. Saunders, and J. van Brake, 1–18. Lanham: University Press of America.Search in Google Scholar
Johansen, T.K. 2005 “In Defense of Inner Sense: Aristotle on Perceiving that One Sees.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 21: 235–76.10.1163/22134417-90000075Search in Google Scholar
Johnstone, M.A. 2012 “Aristotle on Odour and Smell.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43: 143–83.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199666164.003.0006Search in Google Scholar
Lear, J. 1988. Aristotle: The Desire to Understand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511570612Search in Google Scholar
Magee, J.M. 2000. “Sense Organs and the Activity of Sensation in Aristotle.” Phronesis 45 (4): 306–30.10.1163/156852800510243Search in Google Scholar
Murphy, D. 2005 “Aristotle on Why Plants Cannot Perceive.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29: 295–339.Search in Google Scholar
Perälä, M. 2018. “Aristotle on Perceptual Discrimination.” Phronesis 63 (3): 257–92.10.1163/15685284-12341351Search in Google Scholar
Polansky, R.M. 2007. Aristotle’s De Anima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511551017Search in Google Scholar
Price, A.W. 1996 “Aristotelian Perceptions.” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 12: 285–309.10.1163/2213441796X00173Search in Google Scholar
Roreitner, R. 2014. “Perception and Hylomorphism. Receptive Activity of Senses in Aristotle´S De Anima II,5.” Eirene: Studia Graeca et Latina 50: 176–207.Search in Google Scholar
Ross, D. 1961. Aristotle, De Anima. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/actrade/9780198141556.book.1Search in Google Scholar
Scaltsas, T. 1996. “Biological Matter and Perceptual Powers in Aristotle’s De Anima.” Topoi 15 (1): 25–37.10.1007/BF00141304Search in Google Scholar
Shields, C. 2016. Aristotle: De Anima. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Sisko, J.E. 1996. “Material Alteration and Cognitive Activity in Aristotle’s “De Anima”.” Phronesis 41 (2): 138–57.10.1163/156852896321051693Search in Google Scholar
Sisko, J.E. 1998 “Alteration and Quasi-Alteration: A Critical Notice of Stephen Everson, Aristotle on Perception.” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 16: 331–52.Search in Google Scholar
Slakey, T.J. 1961. “Aristotle on Sense Perception.” Philosophical Review 70 (4): 470–84.10.2307/2183608Search in Google Scholar
Sorabji, R. 1974. “Body and Soul in Aristotle.” Philosophy 49 (187): 63–89.10.1017/S0031819100047884Search in Google Scholar
Sorabji, R. 1992. “Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception.” In Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, edited by M.C. Nussbaum, and A.O. Rorty, 195–225. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/019823600X.003.0013Search in Google Scholar
Sorabji, R. 2001. “Aristotle on Sensory Processes and Intentionality: A Reply to Burnyeat.” In Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, edited by D. Perler, 49–61. Leiden: Brill.10.1163/9789004453296Search in Google Scholar
Sorabji, R. 2004. “Aristotle on Colour, Light and Imperceptibles.” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 47 (1): 129–40.10.1111/j.2041-5370.2004.tb00247.xSearch in Google Scholar
Tracy, T.J. 1969. Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle. Chicago: Loyola University Press.10.1515/9783111675084Search in Google Scholar
© 2020 Walter de Gruyter Inc., Boston/Berlin
