Abstract
This paper examines the concept of sovereign agency in Nygren’s agapic theology. I argue that Nygren’s theology is structured by a voluntarist-inspired idealization of sovereignty that in effect precludes a viable agapic theory of alterity. ‘Otherness’ plays no essential role in Nygren’s subject-centred ethic. George Grant’s profound meditations on ‘otherness’ in Technology and Justice and other late works will provide the critical perspective for my reading of Nygren and agapist theology in general.
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Notes
See below. Averroism: a derogatory term used for any syncretic theology thought to have been influenced by Averroes (Ibn Rushd).
(Unless otherwise noted, the following in-text references to Aquinas will refer to this volume). See also Q.20, Art. 2. Aquinas will also speak of the will’s independence from the divine intellect, as in 1a, Q.19, Art. 4 ad. 4, where he distinguishes between the will and the intellectus speculativus. The will’s conceived role here is to set thought in motion (for the voluntarist implications of this distinction see my discussion of Duns Scotus below). Nevertheless, we should read such passages in the context of Questions 19 and 20 as a whole, where Aquinas argues (as in the reply of Q. 20, Art.2, and in Q.19, Art 4, ad.3) that the divine will as an inclination (inclinatio) to act on what his intellect has conceived.
Subsequent in-text references to Dionysius will refer to this edition. Pseudo-Dionysius uses “eros” and “agapé” synonymously (709c-709d, 81). See (Buckley 1992) for analysis and translation of key terms.
Dionysius uses the terms synonymously (709c-709d, 81).
See also St. Thomas: 2006a, 1a, Q.14, Art. 6 and 2006b, 1a, Q. 19, Art. 2. For Thomas, creatures participate in the life of God, each according to their own species and uniqueness as individuals. Moreover, God knows his creatures in their proper natures, not merely in an abstract or general kind of way, that is, God knows each creature in “its participation in the divine perfection in some degree” (2006a, 1a, Q.14, Art. 6). See also 2006a, 1a, Q. 14, Art. 11. 6 If Henry is correct the ideas would be “a kind of real being,” namely, “the reality an essence possesses in itself. If the divine ideas have this kind of being creation would simply add existence to an already real essence, and so the total reality of creatures would not be created. In order to assure that creation is from nothing (ex nihilo), Scotus denies to the divine ideas all real being, whether essential or existential, attributing to them solely objective being” [i.e. objects of knowledge] (Maurer 1982, 232).
My goal here is not to intervene in debates between “Radical Orthodox” theorists and others regarding the historical role of Scotus in the Western tradition (see for example Daniel Horan’s (2014) critique of Radical Orthodoxy). I am using Scotus for comparative purposes, not genealogically purposes. Also, I am concerned here with a much more narrowly defined question, namely Scotus’s understanding of epistemic neutrality, a knowledge that has structure but no teleology. Binary logic defines the structure in question and simultaneously allows for an equilibrium of opposite possibilities and a suspension of the will. The picture here is of a will hovering above two teleologically neutral but knowable options.
Scotus (2008, I-A, d.36, part 1, q.2, n.23, 386–387). Subsequent in-text references to Scotus will refer to this edition. Scotus’ Reportatio presents his most mature thoughts on “the ideas.” In Reportatio, as (Sylwanowicz 1996) notes, “there is no reference to their [the ideas] having been produced at an earlier stage as in Scotus’ Ordinatio I d.35, q.1 n.14, where he says that God first produces the ideas and then contemplates the finished products (comparing them).” In Reportatio Scotus appears to have modified this earlier, even more radical conception of the ideas. Here he “talks of God knowing intelligibles which are represented by the essence to the intellect, i.e. they are given” (250). Of course, as I note below, the truly radical part of Scotus’ theology of the ideas is not merely their manner of production, but his reduction of these intelligibles to the status of propositional statements. For excellent discussion of Scotus’ theology of the divine ideas see (Cross 1999, ch.4)
In terms of the divine economy “the principle of producing the Holy Spirit is the infinite will having an infinite lovable object present to it …” (I-A, d.11, q.1. n.12. 408).
This idea will become particularly important in William of Ockham’s conception of divine volition (I-A, d.36 part, q.2, n.78, 406). For Ockham, “before its production a form is neither existence nor essence … therefore, it is pure nothing. Further, the existence of such a form is nothing before it is produced; therefore, the essence is nothing as well, since they are the same” (Ockham 1998, II.8). And so “from eternity God saw all the things that were able to be created, and yet at that time they were nothing” (Ockham 1998, VI.6). For Ockham, Maurer writes, God’s knowledge of his creatures is “nothing but the creatures themselves as eternal objects of God’s knowledge” (Maurer 1990, 227).
For Scotus, we are allowed to posit distinctions between the will and intellect in God, even as we acknowledge our incomprehension in the face of God’s absolute simplicity. “Scotus holds that there is a distinction mid-way between a real distinction and a merely rational or conceptual distinction. He calls it the ‘formal distinction.’ Roughly two realities—two aspects of one thing—are formally distinct if and only if they are both really identical and susceptible of definition independently of each other” (Cross 1999, 149).
For Scotus, we are permitted to say that God loves his creatures in the sense that he wills them to share in his own self-love (Wolter 1986, 20). However, this still requires us to define what we mean by love from a voluntarist perspective. If in the mind of God, created beings (with respect to God’s will) are merely indifferent objects, then “love” would be nothing more than a force of will, motiveless volition. There would be no distinction between the statements “God loves his creatures” and “God wills his creatures.”
Subsequent in-text page references will refer to publication.
Italics removed.
The Hegelian-Kojevean master-slave dialectic is a notable example (Kojève 1980). See (Anderson 2013) for an instructive survey of modern alterity theory. If there are any ethical implications to dialectical alterity theory, it has to do with the way it gets us to recognize our mutually intertwined identities as such. However, dialectical synthesis, that is, the recognition of intertwined identity and mutual dependence, is ultimately grounded in opposition, in surmounted violence. This is a “peace” that requires violence as its ground, an identity forged in the hard-fought victory over oppositional polarities. It is also a ground to which any peaceful relation may well have to return in order to live out the truth of its own synthesis.
Another option would be to think of otherness as something so radically other in that it functions neither as a dialectical foil, nor as an appraised end. Emmanuel Levinas takes this approach. However, we should note that this approach is analogous to Nygren’s theology. It is an affirmation of absolute otherness, an otherness that is so other that it simply demands obedience and communicates itself through the force of a command. Indeed, for Levinas, the call to responsibility, as both non-appraisive and non-dialectical, is ultimately defined in legalistic terms. “Otherness” comes to function as an accusation and a command to obedience (Levinas 1979, 51,162, 178, 201, 291). True, Levinas also presents the “other” as a teacher (51). But the pedagogical metaphor needs specification. What kind of teacher? What makes the teaching ethical? It would appear that what makes it ethical is its legislative authority. We call it “ethical” because it accuses and commands obedience.
Subsequent in-text references will refer to this volume unless otherwise noted.
Subsequent in text references St. Augustine will refer to this volume.
Subsequent in-text references will refer this source, unless otherwise noted.
Is important to note that Grant’s arguments are not necessarily antinomian, merely that, for Grant, Christian ethics goes beyond the requirements of the law. The role of the law in relation to love is not an issue that I have the space or capacity to deal with in this paper, however.
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The author would like to thank Lucinda Dixon for her editorial assistance as well as two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions and careful reading of the text.
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Graham, G. Voluntarism and Love: Grant and Nygren on Agapé and Eros. SOPHIA 60, 965–988 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00768-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-020-00768-7