Abstract
A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where S’s true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form “X occurred because Y occurred” require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more familiar versions. It is argued that the position: (a) yields a better solution to the lottery problem, and (b) may be grounded in a more general theory of virtue and credit.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
S. Cohen (1988) ArticleTitle‘How to Be a Fallibilist’ Philosophical Perspectives 2 91–123
Cohen, S.: forthcoming, ‘Contextualist Solutions to Epistemic Problems: Skepticism, Gettier and the Lottery’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
M. DePaul L. Zagzebski (2003) Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology Oxford University Press Oxford
DePaul, M.: forthcoming, ‘Character Traits, Virtues and Vices: Are there None?’, in Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume IX: Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology.
K. DeRose (1995) ArticleTitle‘Solving the Skeptical Problem’ Philosophical Review 104 1–52
M. Engel SuffixJr. (1992) ArticleTitle‘Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXX 2 59–75 Occurrence Handle10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb01715.x
J. Feinberg (1970) Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility Princeton University Press Princeton
J. Greco (1995) ArticleTitle‘A Second Paradox Concerning Responsibility and Luck’ Metaphilosophy 26 81–96
J. Greco (2003) ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’ M. DePaul (Eds) et al. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology Oxford University Press Oxford
K. Lehrer (2000) Theory of Knowledge EditionNumber2 Westview Press Boulder, CO
T. Nagel (1979) Mortal Questions Cambridge University Press Cambridge
W. Riggs (2002) ArticleTitle‘Reliability and the Value of Knowledge’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 79–96
L. Ross R. Nisbett (Eds) (1991) The Person and the Situation McGraw-Hill New York
E. Sosa (1991) Knowledge in Perspective Cambridge University Press Cambridge
E. Sosa (2000) ArticleTitle‘Skepticism and Contextualism’ Philosophical Issues 10 1–18 Occurrence Handle10.1111/j.1758-2237.2000.tb00002.x
M. Walker (1991) ArticleTitle‘Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency’ Metaphilosophy 22 14–27
L. Zagzebski (1999) ‘What Is Knowledge?’ J. Greco E. Sosa (Eds) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology Blackwell Publishers Oxford 92–116
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Greco, J. A Different Sort of Contextualism. Erkenntnis 61, 383–400 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9280-8
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-9280-8