Abstract
The phenomenological starting point of this paper is the world of the bioethical subject, the person engaged in moral deliberation about practices of intervention on living bodies. This paper develops a perspective informed by the hermeneutic tradition in phenomenology, approaching bioethical thinking as situated within specific contexts of meaning and conceptuality, frameworks through which the phenomena of the world are interpreted and made sense of by the reasoning subject. It focuses on one dimension of the hermeneutic world of contemporary bioethics, that of the relation between bioethics and biological science. This paper shows how taking a phenomenological-hermeneutic perspective can highlight an important but often overlooked way in which biology helps to structure spaces of bioethical sense-making, with substantive consequences for moral judgement. Bioscientific discourse provides us with interpretive resources for making sense of the living world around us and within us. Different interpretive resources reflect different assumptions about the ontology of living beings, humans included. Since, as is argued here, judgements about moral significance in bioethics can depend upon suppositions about the ontology of life, the way that scientific discourse interpretively constitutes the phenomena of life as intentional objects can thereby channel moral thinking in particular ways. The central thesis of this paper is that critical engagement with this ‘hermeneutics of biology’ is vital for contemporary bioethics. To illustrate, the paper explores the hermeneutic constitution of the genome and its relationship to issues of human identity in the context of genetic technology. Alternative interpretations of the genome—as ‘programme’ or as ‘developmental resource’—differently shape bioethical reasoning in this context. Choices of description in bioscience are in this way partly ethical questions, questions about how we ought to comport ourselves towards each other and the living world beyond.
For helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper the author thanks Lewis Coyne, Jacob Lucas, Giovanna Colombetti, and participants at the University of Exeter’s Egenis Research Exchange (ERE), 27th April 2020.
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Notes
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Hermeneutics is the study of interpretation. In this paper I refer specifically to phenomenological or ‘philosophical’ hermeneutics—the approach to hermeneutics that has grown out of the philosophical school of phenomenology, particularly via the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which in turn drew from that of Martin Heidegger. Canonical texts are Heidegger’s 1923 lectures, Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity (1999 [1923]), many of the core ideas of which were later incorporated into Being and Time (2010 [1927]); and Gadamer’s Truth and Method (1993 [1960]). This tradition also has roots in earlier thinkers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey: see Grondin (1994 [1991]) for a detailed history.
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See Rehmann-Sutter (2000, pp. 342–343; 2006, pp. 329–331; 2010, pp. 13–14, 26); Scully (2006a, pp. 351, 358); Neumann-Held and Rehmann-Sutter (2006, pp. 2–3). For a similar assessment about the inter-relation of bioethics and biological theory, representing a more ‘analytic’ tradition, see Lewens (2015, pp. 1–8).
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Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012). Quote from page 445.
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Rehmann-Sutter et al. (2012, pp. 438–439).
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See Lewontin (1991, Chap. 1).
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Rehmann-Sutter (2010, p. 26).
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This account of ‘genetic essentialism’ is largely inspired by important work by Susan Oyama over several decades, e.g. (2000a [1985], Chs 5–6; 2000b, pp. 152–155; 2002; 2009, §§3.2.2–3.3; 2010, pp. 406–407, 410–416; 2016). See also Oyama et al. (2001, p. 3); Lewontin (2000 [1998], Chap. 1); Mauron (2001, 2002); Barnes and Dupré (2008, Chaps. 7 & 8); Godfrey-Smith (2007, p. 113); Rehmann-Sutter (2002, pp. 29–33; 2008, p. 39; 2010); Scully (2006a).
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The distinction between ‘genotype’ and ‘phenotype’ originated with Wilhelm Johannsen in 1909. By the former he meant the “inner constitution” of the being, and the latter the perishable manifestation of this: i.e. essence and appearance (‘phenotype,’ in fact, was named after the Greek term phainein, ‘to appear’): see Meloni (2016, pp. 60–63).
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Oyama et al. (2001, p. 3).
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When the language of programmes and blueprints dominates, modern biology acquires a (somewhat ironic) conceptual isomorphism with natural theology, and its descendent intelligent design theory, with the role of the designer God being played by Natural Selection, conceived of as a purpose-imbuing force. Here is not the place to pull this thread further, but see Rehmann-Sutter (2010, p. 16); Oyama (2000a [1985], pp. 12–15; 2009); Ingold (2013, Chap. 5).
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On the mediation of development by the organism’s sensitive responses to the environment, see e.g. Barker (2015, pp. 47, 53–62); Laland et al. (2015, pp. 3–5); West-Eberhard (2005b); Moczek (2012, 2015). On the mediation of the organism’s development by its own action on and modification of the environment, part of what is studied in the growing field of niche construction theory, see e.g. Oyama et al. (2001, p. 4); Barker (2015, pp. 53, 62); Nicholson (2014, p. 350); Moczek (2012, pp. 115–116; 2015). On niche construction theory in general, which focuses mostly on the significance of organism-environment co-construction for evolutionary process, see e.g. Laland et al. (2001).
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For example, one can attempt save a version of the programme conception by making the context-sensitivity and plasticity of ontogeny internal to the instructions contained in the programme, instructions that then must be seen as containing highly convoluted conditional branching structures, or disjunctive information. For examples of this move see Tooby and Cosmides (1992, pp. 38–40, 45–46); Williams (1996, p. 62); and for critical discussion of this and similar ideas, see Griffiths (2001, p. 397); Sterelny and Griffiths (1999, p. 104); Barker (2015, p. 49); Linquist et al. (2011, pp. 444–445); Oyama (2000a [1985], pp. 66–67, 131); Laland et al. (2015, pp. 3–5); Moczek (2012, 2015).
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What I’m labelling ‘developmental constructivism’ is also sometimes called ‘constructivist interactionism,’ a ‘constructivist’ or ‘constructionist’ approach to development, or theory of ‘constructive development.’ Its basic ideas are central to various schools of biological theory, in particular: developmental systems theory (DST), see e.g. Oyama (2000a [1985]); Oyama et al. (2001); Eco-Devo and Eco-Evo-Devo, e.g. Gilbert and Epel (2009); Gilbert et al. (2015); the move towards an ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis,’ e.g. Laland et al. (2015); Pigliucci and Müller (2010); and certain versions of systems biology, e.g. Noble (2006). See also the role of similar ideas in the recent call for a turn to ‘process ontology’ in biology: Nicholson and Dupré (2018). It is also advocated strongly by Rehmann-Sutter (e.g. 2002; 2006; 2010) and Scully (e.g. 2006a).
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Ingold (2011, p. 8).
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As is often suggested by evolutionary psychologists who employ ideas of genetic programming, e.g. Pinker (2002).
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Gilbert (1992, p. 96).
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See also Mauron (2002).
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The debate was ostensibly about mitochondrial replacement therapy (so-called ‘three parent’ IVF treatment), which involves transferring the nucleus of the maternal egg into an enucleated donor egg, in order to effectively replace the embryo’s mitochondria, mutations in which can be a cause of certain inherited diseases. However, the objection raised here could apply to any form of germline genetic modification. (Interestingly, the technique in question does not affect nucleic DNA, only that of mitochondria in the egg cell. Some may argue that this is a significant distinction regarding the question of one’s ‘genetic identity.’ However, the objector did not see the distinction as significant in this way, so it remains a good illustration for our purposes.) For more information on the technique, and the UK parliament’s decision to allow the procedure, see Coghlan (2015); Scully (2017).
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BBC Radio 4 (2015 [my emphasis]).
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Neither of which, in fact, need be assumed. Firstly, uniqueness: Monozygotic twins have identical zygotic genome sequences. If DNA sequence defines numerical identity, then we must infer that twins of this sort are not in fact separate persons, but rather one person, with two spatially separate parts. This is, to put it mildly, counter-intuitive: see also Mauron (2002, pp. 959–961). Second, fixity: It is commonly believed that because all the cells in an individual’s body are descended from the same original cell, they contain the same genetic sequence. In fact, genetic heterogeneity can be introduced in various ways, such as through random changes (‘errors’) in DNA copying during mitosis, and various other kinds of genetic mosaicism and chimerism, some very common: see Dupré (2012, pp. 119–122). Furthermore, if we give a fine-grained enough chemical description of DNA, then genetic sequence can vary significantly between different kinds of cell within a particular body, due to processes such as methylation of the cytosine base: see Dupré (2012, p. 123); Barnes and Dupré (2008, pp. 84–87). It is empirical evidence such as this that ‘pulls us up short’ when we assume the hermeneutic framing of the genetic programme.
- 49.
Rehmann-Sutter (2002, pp. 45–47).
- 50.
Scully (2006b, p. 179).
- 51.
- 52.
Scully (2006b, p. 184).
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Rehmann-Sutter (2006, p. 331).
- 55.
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Griffiths, J.O. (2021). Bioethics, the Ontology of Life, and the Hermeneutics of Biology. In: Ferrarello, S. (eds) Phenomenology of Bioethics: Technoethics and Lived-Experience. The International Library of Bioethics, vol 84. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65613-3_1
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