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Realizing race

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Abstract

A prominent way of explaining how race is socially constructed appeals to social positions and social structures. On this view, the construction of a person’s race is understood in terms of the person occupying a certain social position in a social structure. The aim of this paper is to give a metaphysically perspicuous account of this form of race construction. Analogous to functionalism about mental states, I develop an account of a ‘race structure’ in which various races (Black, White, Asian, etc.) are functionally defined social positions. Individual persons occupy these social positions by ‘playing the role’ characteristic of those positions. The properties by which a person plays a race role, are the realizers for one’s race. I characterize the social construction of a person’s race in terms of a realization relation that satisfies a ‘subset’ condition on the social powers of raced persons. Races, on this view, are functionally defined, multiply realizable social kinds. The final section of the paper outlines some explanatory benefits of the account.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, Alcoff (1995, 2006), Ásta (2018), Boxill (2001), Diaz-Leon (2015), Garcia (2005), Gooding-Williams (1998), Haslanger (2012b, d, e), Mallon (2003, 2016), Mills (1998a), Omi and Winant (2015), Outlaw (1996), Root (2000), Shelby (2005), Sundstrom (2002), and Taylor (2000, 2013).

  2. Some choose not to use the term ‘race’ to describe such social groups/positions. Hardimon’s (2014) preferred term is ‘socialrace’; Blum’s (2010) and Hochman (2017) is ‘racialized group’; Glasgow’s (2009) is ‘race*’.

  3. The connection between functionalism in the philosophy of mind and social reality has not gone unnoticed. Kincaid (1990), Ruben (1985: chapter 3), Sawyer (2002, 2003), Wilson (2004) and Witt (2011) all recognize the applications of notions like ‘function,’ ‘multiple realizability,’ and ‘emergence’ to social properties. However, my application of these notions to the construction of race is, I believe, novel.

  4. There are notable exceptions, e.g., Ásta (2018).

  5. See Blum (2010) and Hochman (2017). See Glasgow (2009) and Hardimon (2014) for related concepts.

  6. Hochman (2017) offers an account of racialization in terms of developmental systems theory. But the account focuses on the various factors that produce racialized groups rather than the nature of the production itself.

  7. See Haslanger (2012f, 2016) and Porpora (1989: 198ff) for similar views of social structure. Also see Burman (2007: chapter 5) and Barnes (2017).

  8. Haslanger (2016: 118). Both Giddens (1981: 26) and Shapiro (1997: 73) draw a distinction between systems and structures.

  9. See Ritchie (forthcoming) and Koslicki (2008: 235–236).

  10. Witt (2011) treats social positions, e.g., genders, functionally but does not understand functions vis-à-vis functionalism about the mind as I do.

  11. See Block (1980), Fodor (1968), Lewis (1980) and Putnam (1975).

  12. Constructionists have explored role norms in depth. See Ásta (2013, 2018), Hardimon (1994), Haslanger (2012d: 279, 2016), Ritchie (forthcoming), Thomasson (2016), and Witt (2011).

  13. I take it that the specific norms applied to members of races change with relative frequency. It does not follow, however, that when the specific norms change, so do races. The norms that help individuate a race may be defined in a general way to allow for specifications.

  14. One possible way of extending this view is to let the normative profile of a race determine its function in the operation and maintenance of the structure. This provides a link between our account and functionalism in sociology. According to Kincaid (1990: 343), “Functional explanations [in sociology] involve two broad claims: (1) that some social practice or institution has some characteristic effect and (2) that the practice or institution exists in order to promote that effect.” Insofar as a race makes a characteristic contribute to a race structure, it exists in order to make that contribution. In Mills’ (1998b) structure, discussed below, the explanation for the existence of various racial categories is their function to promote White supremacy.

  15. Jenkins (2016) also uses the language of functioning as a (sub) person. Jenkins’ notion of the function of persons is an extension of Searle’s (1995, 2010) idea of a ‘status function’ that is applied to persons who are regarded as having a certain status. These status functions create and modify a person’s deontic powers.

  16. It is controversial whether race is inherently hierarchical. While this model of the race structure individuates races according to their functions in a social structure, that alone does not entail that race is inherently hierarchical. It is logically possible to have a race structure with functionally distinct positions that are non-hierarchically related. But logical possibility aside, historical and current race structures are hierarchical and the purpose of thinking about race in terms of social structure is to draw attention to this fact with the goal of dismantling them. See Alcoff (1995) and Outlaw (1996) who argue that there can be race without hierarchy. See Hardimon (2014), Haslanger (2012c), and Jeffers (2013) for further discussion.

  17. Note that this approach is neutral about whether there is a set of properties that are necessary and sufficient for racial membership or whether there are merely clusters of properties, each of which are sufficient for racial membership (see Outlaw 1996: 84; Mallon 2016). Either stance will specify a range of properties that may realize one’s race.

  18. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this point.

  19. Cf. Witt (2011) on gender and Neander (1999) on biological functions. Appiah (1994) and Root (2000: S636) discuss the ‘rules’ for being white or black, Alcoff (2006: 184) ‘racial etiquette.’

  20. See Alcoff (2006: 185). See Hacking (1995) on the ‘looping’ effect in human kinds.

  21. See Funkhouser (2007: 311), Haug (2010: 325) and Shoemaker (2007: 3).

  22. See Clapp (2001: 130), Pereboom and Kornblith (1991), Pereboom (2011), Shoemaker (2001, 2007, 2011) and Wilson (1999, 2011).

  23. A similar but more general principle for social kinds was formulated in my (2018b: 247). In Subset, ‘F1, …, Fn’ and ‘K’ refer to property types. However, when F1, …, Fn realize K, there are tokens of F1, …, Fn and K such that the token social powers of a K-token are a non-empty proper subset of the token powers of F1, …, Fn-tokens. There will be other constraints on which properties can help realize R, viz. morphology and ancestry.

  24. Jenkins (2016) holds that social powers come with the imposition of status functions to persons. Our views agree to the extent that there is an intimate connection between social positions, morphology/ancestry, and social power. We differ in the mechanism that produce race and its social powers.

  25. Obviously, the existence of this power also depends upon the functioning of certain institutions and laws. To make sense of this we can avail ourselves of Shoemaker’s (1981) and Wilson’s (2001, 2004) distinction between ‘core’ and ‘total’ realizers. Core realizers—morphology and ancestry for race—are the most significant in bringing about the realized property but may only do so in the appropriate context. The total realizer includes the core realizers as well as the relevant contextual factors.

  26. These brief remarks point toward a metaphysics of intersectionality, development of which is work for another time. See Ritchie (forthcoming) and Bernstein (ms.) for recent metaphysical accounts of intersectionality.

  27. This could help explain Haslanger’s (2012b, 2014) view that, for example, Black men in America or Indigenous men in Australia might fail to function as men (though they would still be males) in certain contexts due to racist oppression.

  28. This section is heavily indebted to my (2018b: 247ff.) where I provide the same argument for social kinds in general.

  29. As I noted in (2018b: 247), other subset theorists go further and argue that this feature shows that the realized property is the only cause for the relevant effect. See Shoemaker (2001: 31) and Yablo (1992: 274).

  30. Haslanger (2012b: 239–240) addresses a similar worry, which she calls the ‘normativity’ concern. I take up a general version of this objection in my (2018b: 248–9). Thanks to Bradley Rettler for originally putting the objection to me.

  31. My approach is similar to those found in Ásta (2018: 123–124), Jenkins (2016: Chpt 1), and Mallon (2004). It is most similar to Ásta’s since she also builds a counterfactual component into her account.

  32. Thanks to Kate Ritchie, Ásta, Asya Passinsky, Todd Jones, Sam Lebens, Brad Rettler, Robin Dembroff, Katharine Jenkins, Åsa Burman, Elanor Taylor, Soon-Ah Fadness, Nicholaos Jones, and Philip Swenson for helpful conversations and comments on this paper. Thanks, also, to audiences at the 2018 Pacific APA, the 2017 Alabama Philosophical Society Meeting, the 2017 Early Career Metaphysics Workshop at Virginia Tech, and the 2018 International Social Ontology Society Meeting in Boston, MA.

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    Aaron M. Griffith

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Griffith, A.M. Realizing race. Philos Stud 177, 1919–1934 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01291-3

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