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Interdisciplinary success without integration

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Abstract

Some scholars see interdisciplinarity as a special case of a broader unificationist program. They accept the unification of the sciences as a regulative ideal, and derive from this the normative justification of interdisciplinary research practices. The crucial link for this position is the notion of integration: integration increases the cohesion of concepts and practices, and more specifically of explanations, ontologies, methods and data. Interdisciplinary success then consists in the integration of fields or disciplines, and this constitutes success in the sense that unification is epistemically desirable. In contrast to this account, I defend the thesis that successful interdisciplinary interaction does not necessarily imply the integration of these disciplines. I show this at the hand of two cases. In both the case of evolutionary game theory and the case of hyperbolic discounting, genuine interdisciplinary exchange took place. From both exchanges, the respective economic fields emerged substantially altered – it wasn’t just a juxtaposition of disciplines in which disciplinary identities remained unchanged. Yet in neither case did the disciplines integrate. Rather, they developed their own concepts and methods, their own explanations, own ontologies, and their own views of what proper data standards were. Furthermore, the fields that emerged from these exchanges were very successful, if measured at the hand of properties like explanatory success, increase of control, bibliometrics and grant yields. Thus, I argue, there are cases of interdisciplinary success without integration.

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Notes

  1. The body of literature that I am referring to here is itself inter-disciplinary. Philosophers of science have contributed at a comparatively late stage (e.g. van der Steen 1990. Grantham 2004; D’Agostino 2012; Brigandt 2013; O’Malley 2013). Earlier contributions came from author located in very different disciplines (Klein from English literature, Jansch from engineering, Heckhausen from psychology, Gibbons and many of his co-authors from science and technology studies, to give just some examples of authors who began publishing in the 1970s and 80s).

  2. The exact role that interdisciplinary research strategies must play is somewhat unclear. Obviously, they must play at least some actual causal role in meeting these challenges for it to be counted as interdisciplinary success. But must that role be necessary (or could it have been achieved otherwise)? And must it be the dominant cause (or is a contributing role enough)? I will not discuss these difficult questions here, but rather focus on the claim that any interdisciplinary success necessitates integration of disciplines.

  3. 177 citations according to Google scholar in 2015.

  4. Evolutionary game theory also has been adopted by other disciplines, notably philosophy. Although an interesting topic in its own right, I will disregard it here.

  5. For an account of the pioneering role of Maynard Smith for agent-based modelling, see Sigmund (2005, 9).

  6. For example, the Canada Research Chair in Economic Theory and Evolution, founded in 2002 is supposed to deliver “Theoretical work on the relationship between evolutionary biology and human economic choice, attitudes toward risk, and strategic interactions.” Yet in practice, this chair is occupied by an economist, who has published only 2 papers in biology outlets.

  7. When searching the database of NSF-funded projects over the last 20 years, from the 36 funded projects relating to evolutionary game theory, not a single involved a collaboration between economists and biologists.

  8. Recently, there seems to be a development of evolutionary game theory as a “neutralized tool” to be used across different disciplines: problem-oriented, but without disciplinary identity. This development might have been heralded already by Jörgen Weibull’s textbook from 1995, which stressed mathematical analysis, but had little to offer in terms of applications. Two new journals are the result of this development: Dynamic Games and Applications, founded 2011, “is devoted to the development of all classes of dynamic games, [including] evolutionary games” and its coverage includes “applications to economics and management science, biology and ecology,…” (Website). Similarly, the Journal of Dynamics and Games (founded 2014) is an applied mathematics journal, which includes papers on evolutionary game theory and aims at applications to economics as well as biology. The need for such a neutral identity, in my view, arises from the increased disciplinary distances of those parts of biology and economics where this neutral theory is supposed to be applied.

  9. Economists were also comparatively more successful than other disciplines. While they acquired 24 NSF grants for evolutionary game projects since 1991, mathematicians only obtained 7 and biologists only 5.

  10. Strotz (1956) paper, the most visible expression of these early economic views, was cited only 24 times in economic journals until 1980, as a search of the Social Science Citation Index [SSCI] reveals. Since the 1980s, however, it has been cited more than 420 times. Thus, it required the mediation through behavioural economics that made Strotz’ paper a classic in the economics literature.

  11. A possible exception of this observation can be found in some business schools. There, it seems, scholars are encouraged to work on topics that conceptually, methodologically and institutionally straddle both disciplines. I give just two examples with quotations from their respective websites.

    • “Professor Weber [Columbia Business School] works at the intersection of psychology and economics. She is an expert on behavioral models of judgment and decision making under risk and uncertainty.”

    • “Vladas Griskevicius [Carlson School of Management] has published over 40 articles in top business and psychology journals examining sustainability, green marketing, motivation, emotion, social influence, social norms, and conspicuous consumption.”

  12. One Nobel (Kahneman) and one Clark Medal (Rabin).

  13. To name but a few: the Chair for Behavioral and Experimental Economics at LMU Munich; the Slater Family Behavioral Economics Chair at Boston University; the Paul A. Volcker Chair in Behavioral Economics at Syracuse University; and the Research Chair of Decision Theory and Behavioral Game Theory at ETH Zürich.

  14. Economists were also comparatively more successful than other disciplines. While they acquired 144 NSF grants for “discounting” or “self-control”-related projects, psychologists only acquired 28.

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Acknowledgement

Previous versions of this paper were presented at the workshop “What is Interdisciplinary Success?” in Lund and at the pre-EPSA symposium “Towards Philosophies of Interdisciplinarity” in Helsinki. I thank both of these audiences for very valuable comments. Financial support from TINT, the Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of Social Science, made this research possible. Thank you!

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Grüne-Yanoff, T. Interdisciplinary success without integration. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 6, 343–360 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-016-0139-z

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