Abstract
This paper deals with the concept of ‘mark’ (or character, in German Merkmal) in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. It examines the question of what marks are for Kant: Are they marks of things or of our thinking? Are they ontic object marks or conceptual marks? Are marks ontological or logical in nature? We will see that in Kant’s philosophy, as well as in the thought of his rationalist predecessors, the concept of the mark is embedded in a peculiar ambiguity in that it stands for both objective qualities and conceptual representations. – In a first step we will trace the ambiguity of the mark in Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries (especially in Meier, Wolff and Leibniz). In a second step, we will show that Kant retains the aforementioned ambiguity in terms of wording but overcomes it in terms of content.
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