Journal of the History of Philosophy

Descartes' First Meditation: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed LEO GROARKE I.~ rH~: I-AMOUS ARGUMENT which begins his first meditation, 1)escartes induces sceptical doubts by considering the hypothesis that he is mistaken about all that he believes. "1"opush doubt to its furthest extreme, he imagines that he is fooled by a malicious demon, a malin gOnie who has "employed all his energies in deceiving me." Leaving aside his response to this hypothesis, it may be noted that it is often hailed as an unprecedented tour de force which presents the problem of scepticism with a hitherto unknown act, eness. Popkin , |or example, writes that the possibility of a Cartesian demon "discloses the full force of scepticism in the most striking fashion, and unveils a basis fl~r doubting apparently never dreamed of before."' It is in keeping with such sentiments that most commentators write as though Descartes' argument is new and original, and something which he himself conco(:ts. ~ In order to show thai this is not the case, I propose to consider a number of earlier thinkers who use similar arguments to defend the sceptical point of view. In particular, I shall focus on arguments propounded by 1he Academic sceptics, the lslamic philosopher ai-GhazalL and by Nicholas of Autrecourt, a fi)urteenth century Frenchman who employed sceptical arguments in his critique of Aristotle. My general thesis is that the kinds of doubts which begin the Meditations are not new or novel, but common ['are in the works of sceptical philosophers. I shall also argue that there is good reason to believe ' Richard 1t. l'opkin, The ttt~to~ oJ Sceptzct~'m:]romErrtsmtLsto Spmom (Berkeley: University of (:alifinnia l'ress, 1979), 178. + Ill a lengthy search of works on 1)escartes, I found only two authr ((;ouhier and Curley) who consider the possibility of earlier versions of Descartes' argument. Both consider tile Academic sceptics in this regard, though even the) ignore the other thinkers we shall discuss. [281] 289 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSPHY 22:3JULY i984 that Decartes' argument is borrowed from the sceptics, most likely from Academic scepticism (a suggestion already made by Henri Gouhier in La pens~e metaphysiquede Descartes3). This is not to say that there is nothing new in Descartes' use of the argument, however, for he is the first to use it as a basis for a philosophical defense of certainty.4 It may also be said that more than any of his predecessors--with the notable exception of Ghaz~li--he uses it as a focal point of doubt, and in this way creates a more powerful account of the sceptical dilemma. It must nevertheless be said that his originality has been exaggerated, and that he is not the first to consider the "hyperbolical" doubts which accompany the demon hypothesis. In discussing the works of earlier thinkers who entertain what Beck has called "the most daring metaphysical supposition the human mind can'invent,''5 I hope to draw attention to a number of philosophers who have not received the attention they deserve, and to give an indication of the richness of their philosophy. 2 Before we turn to the early versions of Descartes' argument, we should note the way it is presented in Meditation I. Descartes begins by noting that he has from "earliest youth" held false beliefs, and by declaring that he will test all of his beliefs by questioning the principles on which they are based. Given that he has in the past relied upon his senses as a guide to truth, he first notes that they have often been deceived. The possibility of such deception does not seem serious, however, for it concerns things which are "hardly perceptible" or "very far away," and does not contaminate more immediate perceptions. It does not, for example, cast doubt on the obvious fact that "I am here, seated by the fire, attired in a dressing gown, having this paper in my hand. ''6 It nevertheless seems that these observations are susceptible to 3 Henri Gouhier, La pensOemetaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962), 35. 4 Descartes' attempt is not without its difficulties, and it would be a mistake...