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Dynamic perceptual completion and the dynamic snapshot view to help solve the ‘two times’ problem

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Abstract

Perceptual completion fills the gap for discrete perception to become continuous. Similarly, dynamic perceptual completion (DPC) provides an experience of dynamic continuity. Our recent discovery of the ‘happening’ (H) element of DPC completes the total experience for dynamism in the flow of time (FOT). However, a phenomenological explanation for these experiences is essential. The Snapshot Hypotheses especially the Dynamic Snapshot View provides the most comprehensive explanation. From that understanding the ‘two times’ problem (TTP) can be addressed. The static time of spacetime cosmologies has been irreconcilable with the dynamic FOT. Dismissing the FOT as an illusion is unsatisfactory. Therefore, we provide four hypotheses for the TTP.

1) Since cosmological static time demands that all events (cerebral included) are discrete, DPC elements for dynamism should likewise be expected to be discrete and accounted for by a snapshot phenomenology such as the DSV. 2) If temporality can be demonstrated to be similar to apparent motion by being a snapshot phenomenon and not demanding temporal extension it would confirm the DSV and permit reconciliation with static time. 3) If the ‘present moment’ (of the FOT) is subjective as static time theories suggest, it should be possible experimentally for an observer to choose his own ‘present’ by moving (perceptually) to various points in the past with the aid of virtual reality. 4) If dynamism e.g. motion can be precluded without significant information loss or violating physics principles it is a cognitive add-on, thereby contradicting non-static time theories which suggest that time is ‘real.’ We confirm those hypotheses.

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  1. Stanford University Medical Center, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

    Ronald P. Gruber

  2. Department of Physics, California State University East Bay, Hayward, CA, USA

    Ryan P. Smith

  3. Department of Psychology, Montana State University, Bozeman, MT, USA

    Richard A. Block

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Gruber, R.P., Smith, R.P. & Block, R.A. Dynamic perceptual completion and the dynamic snapshot view to help solve the ‘two times’ problem. Phenom Cogn Sci 19, 773–790 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09636-3

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