Abstract
This paper analyses Bohr’s complementarity framework and applies it to biosemiotic studies by illustrating its application to three existing models of living systems: mechanistic (molecular) biology, Barbieri’s version of biosemiotics in terms of his code biology and Markoš’s phenomenological version of hermeneutic biosemiotics. The contribution summarizes both Bohr’s philosophy of science crowned by his idea of complementarity and his conception of the phenomenon of the living. Bohr’s approach to the biological questions evolved – among other things – from the consequences of an epistemological lesson of quantum theory and in light of complementarity of observer as a priori living creature and ex post scientific explanation of the living. In a manifestation of the phenomenon of the living, each model of living system and its description makes accessible – from its own presuppositions, contexts and concepts – some features which are not accessible from the others. Nevertheless, for a general understanding of that phenomenon, incompatible sophisticated approaches are equally necessary. Bohr’s epistemology of complementarity turns out to be a heuristic and methodical framework for testing the extent to which biosemiotics can become one of the special sciences or its potential as a cross-disciplinary branch of study.
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Heisenberg, who worked closely with Bohr, assumed that there was no substantial difference between his and Bohr’s version of quantum theory. Nevertheless, there are important distinctions. Bohr did not interpret Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (relations), originated in spring 1927, the same way Heisenberg did, nor did he need to operate with the so-called collapse of the wave function (reduction of the wave packet), which Heisenberg established as the standard constituent of the Copenhagen interpretation in 1929. As regards the Copenhagen interpretation, which reputedly originated in September 1927 at a well-known conference in Como via Bohr’s so-called Como Lecture, Heisenberg apparently did not introduce the term “Copenhagen interpretation” until the 1950s, and there are still no precise specifications of this interpretation. Furthermore, in comparison with Heisenberg, Wigner and others, Bohr did not put an excessive emphasis on the observer or consciousness in the processes of measurement (e.g. Camilleri 2009; Folse 1985; Grygar 2014; Heelan 1965, 2016; Heisenberg 1949; Wigner 1961).
Regarding the use of the word “complementarity”, Bohr introduced this word in his manuscript (draft) in the summer of 1926, however according to editors Bohr was mistaken (because of the content of the physical subject) and there should have been written 1927 (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW 6): 27 and 58). By contrast Petruccioli writes that editors were rash and Bohr’s draft is really from the summer 1926 (Petruccioli 2011). At any rate, we can trace Bohr’s complementary thinking even back to his youth. Young Bohr was hugely influenced by cross-disciplinary discussions, organized by his father, the experimental physiologist Christian Bohr, who hosted them in their home and who was inspired by Kant and Goethe. Among the regular guests, there was the philosopher Høffding, the linguist Thomsen and the physicist Christiansen. A frequent topic of these disputations was a controversy between mechanistic and vitalistic or teleological approaches to the animate nature. In his father’s laboratory, Bohr also often witnessed discussions on these issues with the pathologist Lang and the anatomist Chievitz (e.g. Pais 1993; Grygar 2014). Høffding describes Christian Bohr’s position as follows: “He followed a line that requires the strict application of physical and chemical methods to physiology. Outside the laboratory he was a keen worshipper of Goethe. When he spoke of practical situations or of views of life, he liked to do so in the form of paradoxes and these were improvised as a rule” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW 6): XXI). The point is that Niels Bohr’s long-lasting search for, as he says, a new unity of knowledge lies in this really unusual approach. And through this approach, Bohr later solved his atomic model. Bohr gradually developed his complementary thinking also on the basis of his correspondence principle (Grygar 2014).
Rubin was Bohr’s step cousin and they often discussed psychological and philosophical problems (visual illusions, free will, mind-body distinction, possibilities of introspection etc.).
The non-sharp complementarity does not appear to correspond with Bohr’s original idea of incompatibility, which he considered deeply in particular by means of physics. The complementarity of requiring pairs or opposites is relatively uninteresting in contrast with Bohr’s conception of incompatible complements, which is a sovereign philosophical, scientific and epistemological problem. It is therefore desirable to continue dealing with this more interesting kind of complementarity (Grygar 2014).
Bohr writes elsewhere: “Indeed, in renouncing logical analysis to an increasing degree, and in turn allowing the play on all strings of emotion, poetry, painting and music contain possibilities of bridging between extreme modes as those characterized as pragmatic and mystic” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 160).
The famous discussions with Einstein reached their climax in 1935. These philosophical-physical disputes (based mostly on thought experiments) dealt with rethinking the Cartesian subject-object split and modern claims about logic, cognition, causality, explanation and the possibilities and conditions of observation. These questions are equally important for biological or biosemiotic research. One of the essential problems lies in the processes of measurement as such, their possibilities and resulting interpretation. Is it, for instance, possible to investigate nature and its properties (hidden parameters), which would be independent of us, our theories and measuring devices which interact with the investigated (phenomenon, object) and influence the measured? Is there the measured with its properties without us or before the act of measuring? Do not the measured phenomena originate in experimental conditions? Would this mean that measuring devices have nothing to influence or disturb? If we allow the existence of measured objects and their properties before the processes of measurement, do we learn of the original properties from the resulting data or are the properties influenced by the measurement? (Grygar 2014; Bohr 1972–2008 (CW7): 339–381).
Thus an object and measuring device cannot be contemplated in a classic way (in classical physics they can be fully isolated or independent on each other during the processes of measurement). The very notion of object hence became problematic and Bohr therefore started to focus on a further elaborated explication of the notion of phenomenon and its application “exclusively to refer to the observations obtained under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole experimental arrangement” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW7): 378, cf. 335).
In Bohr 1972–2008, CW10: 1. Light and life (1933): 28–35; 2. Biology and atomic physic (1937): 49–62; 3. Physical science and the problem of life (1957): 116–123; 4. Quantum physics and biology (1960): 125–132; 5. Physical models and living organisms (1961): 134–137 and 6. Light and life revisited (1962): 164–169.
Bohr’s frequent accent on the interactive systems, spectator-actor frame, common language and conditions that precede or constitute any explicit language or objective description is pivotal for his complementarity and approach to the biological questions for it is essentially penetrated with Bohr’s notion of two kinds of phenomenon and language (Grygar 2014). Although Bohr never explained this dilemma in detail I want to remark that it is possible, from the phenomenological point of view, to distinguish in Bohr’s philosophy of science ontic phenomena (intentional objects or contents) in terms of Husserl’s intentionality (Husserl 1970, 1983, 2001) and ontological non-objectivisable phenomena (existentialia) in light of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology (Heidegger 1962). This distinction is nearly linked with a distinction between predicative (apophantic) and pre-predicative (existential-hermeneutical) dimension of language within Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology (Heidegger 1962).
A philosopher Favrholdt concisely interprets Bohr’s various notions about subject-object partition like this: “The concept of having knowledge presupposes the existence of the subject, which therefore cannot itself form part of our knowledge. Whatever I perceive, I shall never be able to perceive or analyze the subject – myself. A subject perceiving itself is just as impossible to imagine as is a drawing containing itself as an element.” (Favrholdt 1999: 8). Bohr got the idea of subject and object entanglement (among other things) from his favourite Møller’s book for teenagers “En dansk Students Eventyr”. In his lectures or texts, he used parts of the book as an example of the problem of the elusiveness of I, language or interactions in measurement processes and people who came to Copenhagen to work in Universitetets Institut for Teoretisk Fysik (from 1965 Niels Bohr Institutet) “had to”, as Rosenfeld remembers, read that book to improve their Danish and learn more about Bohr’s peculiar dialectical thinking (Grygar 2014; Rosenfeld 1967: 121).
Bohr also writes elsewhere that already “Indian thinkers understood the logical difficulties in giving exhaustive expression to such wholeness. In particular they found escape from apparent disharmonies in life by stressing the futility of demanding an answer to the question of the meaning of existence; realizing that any use of the word ‘meaning’ implies comparison, and with what can we compare the whole existence?” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 160).
Bohr’s issue can be approximated also by means of a famous Augustin’s expression: “What then is time? If no one asks me, I know [or understand; in Latin scio - author’s note]: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not […].” (Augustine 2005: 200). If we are to explicitly answer, we do not know what exactly we are to answer, as if we seemingly did not understand what time is and we provide only various concrete or factual reductions of superposition of implicit understanding time; however the original understanding does not disappear. Similarly Heidegger shows difference between ontological non-objectivisable understanding (Verstehen) and explicit understanding or interpretation (Heidegger 1962).
Heisenberg writes about this in a different way: “One could at the same time assume, as Bohr has suggested, that our knowledge of a cell being alive may be complementary to the complete knowledge of its molecular structure. […] In biology it may be important for a complete understanding that the questions are asked by the species man which itself belongs to the genus of living organisms, in other words, that we already know [as implicit non-objective preunderstanding – author’s note] what life is even before we have defined it scientifically [or expressed it in everyday reflection – author’s note]” (Heisenberg 1958: 104, 107).
In that Delbrück’s letter to Bohr in 1934 he concisely summed up Bohr’s approach to the phenomenon of the living from the limits and perspectives of relations between physics, chemistry and biology or quantum mechanics.
Bohr says that “it is typical of biological researches, however, that the external conditions to which any separate atom is subjected can never be controlled in the same manner as in the fundamental experiments of atomic physics. In fact, we cannot even tell which atoms really belong to a living organism, since any vital function is accompanied by an exchange of material, whereby atoms are constantly taken up into and expelled from the organisation which constitutes the living being” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 34).
Bohr notes that “the whole history of organic evolution presents us with the results of the trying out in nature of the immense possibilities of atomic interactions”, and therefore, among other things, that “organic life is a manifestation of nature’s resources far beyond those used for the construction of machines” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 151).
Adding this standpoint: “In every experiment on living organisms, there must remain an uncertainty as regards the physical conditions to which they are subjected, and the idea suggests itself that the minimal freedom we must allow the organism in this respect is just large enough to permit it, so to say, to hide its ultimate secrets from us” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 34).
Otherwise: “The strict application of those concepts which are adapted to our description of inanimate nature might stand in a relationship of exclusion to the consideration of the laws of the phenomena of life” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW6): 300–301). In Biology and Atomic Physics Bohr writes this: “We are led to conceive the proper biological regularities as representing laws of nature complementary to those appropriate to the account of the properties of inanimate bodies in analogy with the complementary relationship between the stability properties of the atoms themselves and such behaviour of their constituent particles as allows of a description in terms of space-time coordination” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 61).
In the article Physical Models and Living Organisms of 1961, he similarly writes that it is obvious – despite the great discoveries and experimental progress of molecular biology in recent years – that fundamental features of living organisms are not comparable with anything because they are the result of “the whole history of organic evolution, reveal potentialities of immensely complicated material systems, which have no parallel in the comparatively simple phenomena studied under reproducible experimental conditions” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 137).
Elsewhere in Bohr: “Because of their immense complexity it is not surprising that the organisms reveal properties and potentialities, which are in striking contrast with those exhibited by so-called inanimate matter under simple reproducible experimental conditions. It is on this background that such notions as purpose-fulness and self-preservation, referring to the behaviour of organisms as entities, have found fruitful application in biological research” (Bohr 1972–2008 (CW10): 151). McKaughan correctly shows that “Bohr did not think that we can simply add more concepts to expand current physics and chemistry. His point was precisely that the required teleological concepts were incompatible with the correct physical-chemical description and that some biological phenomena are not intelligible in solely mechanical terms” (McKaughan 2005: 517).
Markoš is familiar with Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology and with his non-objective approach to the phenomenon of the living outlined in Being and Time (Heidegger 1962) and analysed at large in the lectures named The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (Heidegger 2001). Markoš translated to Czech several paragraphs from the second part of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics which deals with Heidegger’s privative interpretation and wrote commentary to it (Markoš 2010a: 61–96). Markoš is also inspired by Heidegger’s dual conception of language, i.e. pre-predicative (existential-hermeneutical) and predicative (apophantic) from Being and Time and The nature of language (Heidegger 1982). Markoš and Ovčáčková translated to Czech excerpts from of The nature of language and wrote a commentary on it (Markoš and Ovčáčková 2010: 97–142). As to biology, for example in Being and Time, Heidegger claims that a biological attempt for determination of the essence (Wesen) of the phenomenon of the living cannot be based exclusively on something beyond us, because biology is one of many interpretative capabilities and historical articulations of Being of man (Da-sein) whose fundamental structure is Being-in-the-world.
The question (from the perspective of hermeneutic phenomenology) is whether we can consider other than human creatures in light of hermeneutic performances (whether there are phenomena to it in phenomenological meaning of the word).
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Acknowledgements
I thank editors and reviewers for their valuable comments and cogent suggestions for improvement of my article. Further I thank Anton Markoš for his comments on biosemiotics and Barbieri’s and Markoš’s approach to the phenomenon of the living.
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Grygar, F. Bohr’s Complementarity Framework in Biosemiotics. Biosemiotics 10, 33–55 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-016-9281-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-016-9281-4