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The Identity That Doesn’t Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument

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Abstract

Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as ‘x [is] y’) is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators (upalakṣaṇa). The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’ (tādātmya). This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects.

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Notes

  1. The Mādhva school believes that something is either existent (sat) or inexistent (asat). There is no other option.

  2. The Indian logician always wants to do away with establishing that which is already accepted (siddha-sādhana) by their opponent. For them, even partial assertion of the opponent’s thesis (aṃśataḥ siddha-sādhanam) is a serious vice.

  3. See Śāstrī (1937, pp. 59–78).

  4. Pandurangi (2013, pp. 261–2) writes: ‘The Bhāṭṭas do not accept Samavāya. They replace it by tādātmya. They refute Samavāya by the stock argument that it will lead to infinite regress.’

  5. Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya in Bākre (1934, p. 438): sāmyād anavasthiteḥ. yathaiva hy aṇubhyām atyanta-bhinnaṃ sad dvyaṇukaṃ samavāya-lakṣaṇena saṃbandhena tābhyāṃ saṃbadhyata evaṃ samavāyo ’pi samavāyibhyo ’tyanta-bhinnaḥ san samavāya-lakṣaṇena anyena eva saṃbadhyena samavāyibhiḥ saṃbadhyeta atyanta-bheda-sāmyāt. tataś ca tasya tasya anyonyaḥ saṃbandhaḥ kalpayitavya ity anavasthā eva prasajyeta.

  6. Bhāmatī in Bākre (1934, p. 439): yady ucyeta saṃbandhināv asau ghaṭayati, na ātmānam api saṃbandhibhyām, tat kim asāv asaṃbaddha eva saṃbandhibhyām? evaṃ ced atyanta-bhinno ’saṃbaddhaḥ kathaṃ saṃbandhinau saṃbandhayet? saṃbandhena vā himavad-vindhyāv api saṃbandhayet.

  7. Over a millennium after Śaṅkara, between 1846 and 1893, the British idealist F. H. Bradley (1916) came up with a set of arguments known as Bradley’s Regress. They share the spirit of Śaṅkara’s Regress, although they cover every relation.

  8. AS in Śāstrī (1937, pp. 59–78): guṇādikaṃ guṇyādinā bhinnābhinnaṃ samānādhikṛtatvāt.

  9. An ‘essential feature’ is an internal or defining feature of a thing.

  10. Laghucandrikā in Śāstrī (1937, p. 64) ): upahitopalakṣita-śabdayor hi na viśiṣṭam arthaḥ, kintu yena dharmeṇa upahitam ucyate vidyamānena tena tac-chūnyād vyāvartitam upahita-śabdārthaḥ… tat-kṣaṇopalakṣita-ghaṭo viṣaya ity apy evam. vidyamāna-pada-sthāne avidyamāna-padam iti tu viśeṣaḥ.

  11. The list of abbreviations of logical terms is appended to the body of this paper.

  12. A note on the notation: In each complex phrase, the last element is finally being described. For example, the phrase ‘(pot)R{(pot-ness)Ld(effect-ness)}’ describes an effect-ness.

  13. See Nyāyakośa in Jhalakīkar (1928, pp. 515).

  14. See Nyāyakośa, s. vv. prakāratā and viśeṣya for detailed discussions.

  15. Navyanyāyabhāṣāpradīpa in Jha (2004, p. 30): jāter akhaṇḍopādheś ca pratītāv anullekhe niravacchinnā pratītir bhavati.

  16. Helpful discussions on ‘jāti and akhaṇḍopādhi’ can be found in Sastri (1951, pp. 19–20) and Jha (2004, pp. 28–30)

  17. A traditional example of a molecular (reducible) property is ‘paśutva’. Anything that has hair on its tail has the property ‘paśutva’. Thus, ‘paśutva’ can be defined in terms of ‘hair’, ‘tail’ and ‘having’.

  18. Mohanty (1966, p. 40) rightly says that validity is a hybrid entity.

  19. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī mentions this proverb in his Gūḍhārthadīpikā, which is a commentary on the Gītā, in the comment on the verse ‘antavanta ime dehā’. Source: http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/2_epic/mbh/ext/bhg4c__u.htm.

  20. Helpful discussions on the self-same relation can be found in Matilal (1968) and Shaw (1977).

  21. For a good discussion on the levels of reality, see Timalsina (2009).

  22. Note: (x)(y)Σ: the related structure having x and y related through Σ, and (x)H(y): y having x as a distinguishing feature (x-viśiṣṭa-y).

  23. LC, 125-6: anyathā prātītika-rūpye vyāvahārika-rūpya-lipsoḥ pravṛtty-anupapatteḥ.

    Translation: For otherwise the fact that—the person who desires real silver runs towards the illusory silver—cannot be explained.

  24. AS, 121: bhrama-bādhayor vaiyadhikaraṇyāpatteḥ.

  25. AS, 123-4: pāramārthika-laukika-rajata-tādātmyena pratītaṃ prātibhāsikam eva rajataṃ pratiyogi.

  26. See Jhalakīkar (1928, p. 304).

  27. LC, 128: prātītike … anadhiṣṭhānasyāpi vyāvahārikasya tādātmyāropa-darśanāt. vyāvahārika-rajatasya indriyāsannikṛṣṭatve ’pi tad-aṃśe smṛti-rūpasya bhramasya sambhavāt.

  28. LC, 62: tādātmya-sambandhena rajatādi yatra idam-ādau prakāraḥ, tatra rajatatvādikam api ādhāratva-sambandhena prakāraḥ.

    I have deliberately avoided translating the term ‘ādi’ added to ‘idam’, ‘rajata’ etc. The term means ‘and similar things’. This is to generalize a specific example.

  29. According to NR, 210, only the (Cc)R(Ct-ness) (sāṃsargika-viṣayatā) is irreducible or atomic (akhaṇḍa-dharma); not the Qd-ness or Qr-ness.

  30. LC, 61: tathā hi—‘idaṃ rajatam’ ityādi-jñāne tādātmyādi-saṃsarga-niṣṭhāyā viṣayatāyā rajatādi-viṣayatā-viśiṣṭāyā idaṃ-viṣayatāvacchinnatvaṃ idam-avacchinnatvaṃ ceti pūrvam uktam.

  31. See NR, 208.

  32. NR, 10: idaṃ-viṣayatā … rajata-viṣayatāyām avacchedikā, mūlādikam iva saṃyogādi-viśiṣṭe vihagādau.

  33. For a good discussion on this Sanskrit phrase, see Deshpande (1992, p. 63).

  34. A word-by-word translation gives: idaṃ rajataṃ jānāmi = *this silver I know, and rajatam idaṃ jānāmi = *silver this I know. The ‘*’ indicates that the following structure is ungrammatical.

  35. LC, 38–39: ‘idaṃ rajatam’ ityādi-bhrama-sthale ‘idaṃ rajataṃ jānāmi’ ‘rajatam idaṃ jānāmi’ ityākāra-dvayānubhavād idamādi-viṣayatāvacchinnaṃ rajata-tādātmyādi-viṣayatvaṃ rajatādi-viṣayatāvacchinnam idamādi-tādātmya-viṣayatvañ ca cidrūpānubhava-niṣṭhaṃ bhātīti svīkriyate.

  36. LC, 61: viṣayatā hi yayā viṣayatayā viśiṣṭāyāṃ yasyāṃ viṣayatāyām avacchedikā sā viśeṣaṇī-bhūtā prakāratā, viśeṣya-bhūtā sāṃsargika-viṣayatā, tad-avacchedaka-viṣayatā tu viśeṣyatā.

  37. LC, 61: tathā ca viṣayatā-nisṭhaṃ viṣayatāvacchedakatvaṃ viśeṣyatātvam. tādṛśāvacchedakatvaṃ yāṃ viṣayatām prati tattvaṃ tādṛśāvacchedakatā-nirūpaka-viṣayatātva-rūpaṃ sāṃsargika-viṣayatātvam. viṣayatā-niṣṭhāyāṃ tādṛśāvacchedakatva-nirūpakatāyām avacchedaka-viṣayatātvam prakāratātvam.

  38. LC, 62: tad-avacchinnatvañ ca tan-niṣṭhāvacchedakatā-nirūpakatvam.

  39. LC, 61: tādṛśa-nirūpakatāyāḥ samānādhikaraṇaṃ sad yad-avacchedakatvaṃ tasyaiva prakāratātva-rūpatvāt tādātmyatvādi-niṣṭha-viṣayatāyāṃ tad-abhāvāt. ‘rajata-tādātmyena idaṃ jānāmi’ ity-anubhavo hi rajata-viṣayatā-viśiṣṭasya tādātmya-viṣayatvasya ukta-nirūpakatāṃ gṛhṇan rajata-viṣayatāyā api tāṃ gṛhṇāti … na hi rajatādi-viṣayatvasya idaṃ-viṣayatāvacchinnatve kasyāpi vipratipattiḥ; tasya tādātmyādi-sāṃsargika-viṣayatvāgrāhakeṇāpi ‘idaṃ rajataṃ jānāmi’ ‘idaṃ rajatatvena jānāmi’ ityādy-anubhavena grahaṇāt, tādātmyatva-viṣayatvasya tu ukta-nirūpakatvānanubhavena tad-avacchedakatva-mātraṃ gṛhṇāti.

  40. Its sibling is the sub-cognition, ‘[A piece of] silver is this.’

  41. V, 61: uktānubhave tādātmyatva-viṣayatvasya tādātmya-viṣayatāyām upalakṣaṇatā eva, na tu rajata-viṣayatā iva viśeṣaṇatā.

  42. LC, 62: utka-nirūpakatānavacchedaka-viṣayatā-niṣṭhasya eva ukta-nirūpakatvasya sāṃsargika-viṣayatātva-rūpatvāt … tādātmya-viṣayatā-niṣṭhaiva hi tādṛśa-nirūpakatā tādṛśa-nirūpakatāśrayeṇa rajata-viṣayatvena avacchinnā, na rajata-viṣayatā-niṣṭhā.

  43. In LC, Brahmānanda shows that silver-ness does not limit any determiner-ness residing in silver. But his proof is fairly complicated. We shall not discuss that in this paper.

  44. LC, 59–60: guṇādikaṃ guṇaḥ kriyā jātiḥ viśiṣṭa-rūpam avayavī aṃśī. guṇyādinā guṇinā kriyā-vatyā vyaktyā kevala-rūpeṇa avayavena aṃśena. bhinnābhinnaṃ bhedābhedobhaya-vat. samānādhikṛtatvāt abheda-saṃsargaka-dhī-viṣayatā-yogyatvāt.

  45. V, 59: atra dhīḥ pramā-rūpā niveśyā, anyathā paṭo ghaṭa iti bhramam ādāya vyabhicārāt.

  46. See V, 59-60. Here I have not translated the passage beginning with ‘yo ghaṭatvāvacchinna’ and ending in ‘iti vā pramāyā abhāvāt’. I have reworded it in a simpler way. I wanted to avoid the grammatical nitty-gritties.

  47. GC, 31: anāhāryasyaiva hetutvena, ukta-hetv-abhāvena ukta-buddhy-anutpādāt.

  48. V, 59: dṛṣṭāntāsaṃbhavāt.

  49. In English, this sentence may sound a little weird. But in Sanskrit, as somebody can say, ‘this pot is black’ (ghaṭo nīlaḥ), somebody can also say, ‘this pot is some colour’ (ghaṭo rūpam).

  50. GC, 29: ghaṭo rūpam ityādikaṃ tu lokair anubhūyata eva. paṭe rūpam ityādikaṃ tu kāṇādādi-mata-vāsanā-vilāsaḥ.

  51. LC: 60: samavāyasya alīkatvāt.

  52. LC, 60: samavāya-svīkāre tu nīla-guṇa-samavāyi-bheda-buddhāv ukta-tādātmya-dhītveneva ghaṭādau nīla-guṇa-bheda-buddhau nīla-guṇa-tādātmya-dhītvenāpi pratibandhakatvaṃ vācyam iti gauravam.

  53. LC, 60

  54. Vyāptipañcakarahasya in Tarkavagish (1990, p. 27): viśiṣṭa-sattvasya kevala-sattvānatirekitayā…

  55. LC, 60: nanu––viśiṣṭa-kevalayor bheda-svīkāre ekasyaiva ghaṭasya tat-tat-kṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-rūpāṇy anantāni kalpanīyānīti mahāgauravam––iti cen na; tādṛśa-rūpāṇām anantānāṃ kevala-ghaṭa-bhinnānām akalpane kevala-ghaṭa-viśiṣṭa-buddhitas tādṛśa-rūpa-viśiṣṭa-buddhīnāṃ vailakṣaṇyānupapatteḥ.

  56. LC, 60: na ca–tāsāṃ tat-tat-kṣaṇa-vaiśiṣṭya-viṣayakatvam eva vailakṣaṇyam iti vācyam; viśeṣye viśeṣaṇaṃ tatrāpi ca viśeṣaṇāntaram ity evam ākāre ’pi tat-kṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-ghaṭavad iti jñāne tādṛśa-viṣayakatva-sattvena viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-viṣayatā-śāli-tādṛśa-jñānasya tato vailakṣaṇyānupapatteḥ.

  57. Compare: ‘This man has a stick’ = |[{(stick-ness)Ld(stick)}R(Qr-ness)]Dd[(man)R(Qd-ness)]|P(cognition). Here, the Qr ‘stick’ has a limiter; it is stick-ness. Thus, stick-ness becomes [(stick)R(Qr-ness)]Lr (viśeṣaṇatāvacchedaka). Similarly, the specific moment becomes the limiter of the pot, which is the Qr for the ground in the case of the qualified pot.

  58. LC, 60: jñāna-viṣayayoḥ saṃbandho hi viṣayatātvena tādātmyatvenaiva vā tat-kṣaṇa-viśiṣṭa-vantaṃ jānāmītyādy anubhavena gṛhyate.

  59. LC, 39-40: ākāro hi jñānānāṃ mitho vailakṣaṇyam. tac ca vibhinna-viṣayatva-rūpaṃ.

  60. LC, 65: abheda-virodhi-bhedasya nañ-ādinā ullekhāt.

  61. LC, 61: akhaṇḍānāṃ tādṛśa-dharmāṇāṃ bhāne sati hi viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-viṣayatāka-jñānasya eva tat-kṣaṇa-niṣṭha-viśeṣaṇatāvacchedakatātva-rūpākhaṇḍa-dharma-vad-viṣayatā-nirūpakatvaṃ, na tu viśeṣye viśeṣaṇam iti rītyā jñānasya iti vailakṣaṇyaṃ suvacam, tādṛśa-dharmāṇāṃ sakhaṇḍatve tu nirvakṣya-māṇa-prakāratāvacchedakatātvasya tādṛśa-dvi-vidha-jñānīya-tat-kṣaṇa-viṣayatayoḥ sattvena tādṛśa-jñānayor vailakṣaṇyānupapattir duruddharā eva iti bhāvaḥ.

    Note: Instead of giving a translation of this passage, I have explained it in ordinary language.

  62. See Tattvacintāmaṇi, Anumāna-khaṇḍa, the section on vyāpti-pūrvapakṣa.

  63. Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyabhāmatī in Bākre (1934, p. 72): kāraṇātmanābhinnaṃ bhinnañ ca kāryātmanā| kaṭakādaya ivābhinnā hāṭakātmanā bhinnāś ca kaṭakādy-ātmanā||

  64. LC, 66: yad dhi pūrvaṃ kaṭakādi-rūpeṇa sthitaṃ paścāt kūṇḍala-bhāvam āpannaṃ tasyaiva kaṭakādes tatra kuṇḍalādau hāṭakatva-kuṇḍalatvādi-rūpābhyām abhedaḥ, tad-dhāṭakam idaṃ kuṇḍalam ity apratyayāt.

  65. LC, 67: bheda-sāmānādhikarṇyopalakṣitābhedaviṣayatā…

  66. LC, 68: tad-ghaṭe tasya saṃyogādi-sattve ’pi tad-bheda-samānādhikaraṇa-saṃyogādi-saṃbandhasya asattvān noktadhīḥ pramā.

  67. LC, 69: mām ahaṃ jānāmi.

  68. Sastri (1930, p. 61): ghaṭo ’yam ityādi-pratyakṣaṃ hi ghaṭatvādi-sad-bhāve-mānam, na tu tasya jātitve ’pi.

  69. Geach and Black (1960, pp. 42–55)

  70. See Chapter I of Ayer (1967).

  71. Meaning-wise ‘H’ and ‘P’ are not very different. They both basically mean ‘something having something else’. But they are used in different contexts. Generally, a piece of cognition ‘possesses’ a content, and a thing ‘has’ another one as its distinguishing feature (e.g., a pot having a colour).

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Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to Shruti Bhat and Ajinkya Deshmukh for their invaluable comments on the initial drafts of this paper. Also, Dr. Hugo David’s detailed feedback has been extremely helpful.

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  1. Deparment of Humanistic Studies, Indian Institute of Technology (BHU), Varanasi, India

    Nirmalya Guha

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Guha, N. The Identity That Doesn’t Deny Difference: A Non-dualist Argument. J Indian Philos 49, 257–289 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09467-0

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