 |
[email protected] |
 |
3275638434 |
 |
 |
| Paper Publishing WeChat |
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Lucilla Guidi
Full-Text PDF
XML 918 Views
DOI:10.17265/2159-5313/2019.09.007
In this paper, the transformative and critical potential of the groundlessness of praxis―a central issue in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty––is outlined. It argues that the groundlessness of human praxis entails neither a relativistic nor a foundationalistic epistemological position. On the contrary, following Stanley Cavell and a “resolute reading” of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it claims that Wittgenstein’s aim is to let us acknowledge that both epistemological foundationalism and epistemic relativism are apparent needs, so as to invite us to change our practical way of acting. From this perspective, this paper suggests that Wittgenstein’s account of philosophy addresses the readers and involves a transformation of their own practical attitude and way of acting.
Wittgenstein, Cavell, groundlessness, certainty, transformation, attitude, sensitivity, ethics
Bouvresse, J. (1995). Postfazione a Wittgenstein Note sul Ramod’oro di Frazer. Milano.
Borutti, S. (2000). Wittgenstein Impolitico? In D. Sparti (Ed.), Wittgenstein politico. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Cavell, S. (2005). Philosophy the day after tomorrow. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Coliva, A. (2010). Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, certainty and common sense. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke.
Crary, A. (2007). Wittgenstein and ethics: A discussion with reference to “On Certainty”. In D. Moyal-Sharrock (Ed.), Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (pp. 275-301). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Crary, A. (2007). Beyond moral judgment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Crary, A., & Read, R. J. (Eds.). (2000). The new Wittgenstein. London, New York: Routledge.
Diamond, C. (1996). The realistic spirit: Wittgenstein, philosophy and mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Kusch, M. (2016). Wittgenstein’s “On Certainty” and relativism. In S. Rinofner-Kreidl and H. A. Wiltsche (Eds.), Analytic and continental philosophy. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
Nyri, K. (1986). Wittgenstein 1929-1931: The turning back. In S. Shanker (Ed.), Ludwig Wittgenstein: Critical assessments (Vol. 4, pp. 29-59). Beckenham: Croom Helm.
Norris, A. (2006). Political revisions: Stanley Cavell and political philosophy. In A. Norris (Ed.), The claim to community: Essays on Stanley Cavell and political philosophy. Standford, CA: Standford University Press.
Rentsch, T. (1999). Praktische Gewißheit―Jenseits von Dogmatismus Und Relativismus. Bemerkungen Zu Negativität Und Autonomie Der Sprache Bei Wittgenstein. In H. J. Schneider and M. Kross (Hrsg.), Mit Sprache Spielen: Die Ordnung Und Das Offene Nach Wittgenstein (pp. 137-148). Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Rentsch, T. (2003). Heidegger und Wittgenstein: Existential-und Sprachanalysen zu den Grundlagen philosophischer Antrophologie. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
Stroll, A. (1994). Moore and Wittgenstein On Certainty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1975). On certainty. (abbr. OC). (G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. (1986). Philosophical investigations. (abbr. PI). (G. E. M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Zerilli, L. M. (2016). A democratic theory of judgment. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.