Analysing Leibniz’s Approach to Space, Time, and the Origin of Self-Motion
Abstract
Leibniz looked upon space as an order of co-existing, independent things which differ from each other. Starting from this approach, we may ask whether two specific differences among given things - e.g. one between A and B, the other between C and D - in their turn differ from one another. Steiner, inspired by Leibniz’s approach, showed that on this second level of abstraction they indeed do. However, if we proceed to a third level of abstraction, comparing differences observed on the second stage of abstraction, we shall no longer detect any material, “palpable” difference. In short: Setting off from the co-existence of different things and analysing whether qualitative, material differences are still evident on a second and a third level of abstraction, we are led to conceive space as a system comprising three qualitatively discernible dimensions. - Concerning time, Leibniz and Steiner looked upon it as an arrangement of items succeeding one another. To understand this requires - if we follow Leibniz − to be able to perceive motion. Now, most moving items are passively driven into motion, depending on an external source which imparts the movement. In contrast to that, an actively moving thing generates within itself the impulse to modify its location in relation to other items. Within the world of sensory perceptions, “organic bodies” (i.e. organisms) are capable of self-motion to a certain extent. Nonetheless, a true primary self-motion can only be postulated of a completely independent being. Herewith, Leibniz’s approach to the origin of motion and the therein implied up-welling of time reveals itself to be intimately related to lines of thought developed by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus - albeit employing completely different terms.