Skip to main content
Log in

God’s Random Selection: Reply to Steinberg

  • Published:
Sophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this reply to Jesse Steinberg’s ‘God and the possibility of random creation’, I suggest a procedure whereby a being such as God could randomly select a number from an infinite set.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This argument appears in Howard-Snyder and Howard-Snyder 1994.

  2. Interestingly, I have not seen how to select a random number from a countable set, such as the positive integers. One attempt is to start a stopwatch at t = 0, and take the particle that decays first (at some time t > 0) as the positive integer, e.g., if particle 154 decays first then the number is 154. However, if time is measured by the real numbers then there almost certainly will not be a particle that decays first (for any particle that decays at some time t > 0, there will exist a particle that decayed earlier). If a richer structure is introduced, where time is measured by a number line which includes infinitesimals, then this procedure may succeed. Another possibility is to use the procedure outlined above, together with a mapping from [0,1] onto the positive integers; the trick (difficulty) with this extended procedure is to arrive at a mapping that makes each positive integer an equiprobable outcome. I have not seen how to accomplish this.

  3. That I can see.

  4. In Grover 2003.

  5. See Grover 2003, especially 148–150, for a discussion of the tension between random selection and God’s omnipotence and omniscience. Grover also notes that some of the issues are the same issues that arise in discussions of the tension between free will and God’s omnipotence and omniscience. Indeed another way to attempt to arrive at a random number, besides nuclear particles, would be to employ free agents.

  6. For some recent work suggesting problems with the Howard-Snyders’ argument, see e.g., Grover 2003, Steinberg 2005, Kraay 2005, and Gwiazda 2008.

References

  • Grover, S. (2003). This world, ‘Adams worlds’, and the best of all possible worlds. Religious Studies, 39, 145–163.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gwiazda, J. (2008). Remarks on Jove and Thor. Faith and Philosophy, 25, 79–86.

    Google Scholar 

  • Howard-Snyder, D., & Howard-Snyder, F. (1994). How an unsurpassable being can create a surpassable world. Faith and Philosophy, 11, 260–268.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraay, K. (2005). William L. Rowe’s a priori argument for atheism. Faith and Philosophy, 22, 211–234.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, J. R. (2005). Why an unsurpassable being cannot select create a surpassable world. Religious Studies, 41, 323–333.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Steinberg, J. R. (2008). God and the possibility of random creation. Sophia, 47, 193–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jeremy Gwiazda.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gwiazda, J. God’s Random Selection: Reply to Steinberg. SOPHIA 49, 141–143 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0161-0

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-010-0161-0

Keywords

Navigation