An Examination of the Bundle-Theory of Substance

Abstract

IN THIS PAPER I ARGUE THAT THE BUNDLE-THEORY, THE THEORYTHAT SUBSTANCE IS NOTHING BUT A COLLECTION OF QUALITIES,BRISTLES WITH DIFFICULTIES. I SHOW THAT A CONJUNCTION OFTHE SO-CALLED ESSENTIAL QUALITIES WOULD PRIMARILY YIELD ACONCEPTION NOT OF AN INDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE SOCRATES, FORINSTANCE, BUT OF A SPECIES, I.E., THE CONCEPT 'MAN', ANDTHAT ONLY THE ADDITION OF SOME UNIQUELY DETERMININGACCIDENTAL QUALITIES TO THE ESSENTIAL ONES WOULD YIELD ANINDIVIDUAL SUBSTANCE. BUT, THEN, THESE ACCIDENTAL QUALITIESAND INFINITE IN NUMBER AND ARE THEREFORE ONLY POTENTIAL ANDUNKNOWABLE. THUS, THE "BUNDLE" CAN NEVER BE 'ACTUALIZED'.NOR CAN THE NOTION OF SUBSTANCE BE ELIMINATED IN FAVOR OFDESCRIPTIONS, SINCE THESE SHOULD INCLUDE NEGATIVEDESCRIPTIONS WHICH ARE INFINITE IN NUMBER BECAUSEEXPRESSIBLE IN TERMS OF THE WHOLE UNIVERSE. SINCE NOT ALLDESCRIPTIONS APPLY TO A THING, WHERE THEY DO, THEY MUSTHAVE BEEN ANTECEDENTLY 'DERIVED' FROM THAT THING. HENCE, ICONCLUDE THAT THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR AT LEAST A LIMITEDDEFENSE OF A SUBSTANCE ONTOLOGY.