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Review Socially Extended Epistemology

J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.): Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 336pp, £55.00 HB

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  • 29 July 2019

    This review essay was published without the title and therefore has been corrected.

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Acknowledgements

Thanks to Orestis Palermos for comments on this review.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, Cotham House, Bristol, BS6 6JL, UK

    Joshua Habgood-Coote

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  1. Joshua Habgood-Coote
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Correspondence to Joshua Habgood-Coote.

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This Review Essay was published without the title and therefore has been corrected.

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Habgood-Coote, J. Review Socially Extended Epistemology. Metascience 28, 441–447 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-019-00409-x

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