Abstract
This paper investigates the allegation that behavior such as the Allais Paradox reduces the probability of survival. Examples are demonstrated where maximizing probability of survival in two choice situations imply a set of choices that add up to the Allais Paradox.
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Hagen, O. Survival through the Allais paradox. Theor Decis 32, 209–217 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134052
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134052