Abstract
I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant moral assessments including assessments of moral blameworthiness.
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Haji, I. Frankfurt-Type Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility. J Ethics 10, 255–281 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-5781-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-005-5781-1