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Hume’s Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties

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Metaphysica

Abstract

In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of sense perception and his Copy Principle. I will also show why Hume's argument should be seen as relevant nowadays. David Lewis and his followers in metaphysics continue Hume's line of thinking in this respect, which is opposed by power ontologists (Brian Ellis, Stephen Mumford), for example.

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Notes

  1. References to Hume’s works will be abbreviated in the standard manner as follows. “T” = Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), followed by book, part, section, and paragraph number. “T Abs.” = David Hume, An Abstract of … A Treatise of Human Nature, in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 403–417, followed by paragraph number. “T App.” = David Hume, Appendix, in David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 396–401, followed by paragraph number. “EHU” = David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), followed by section and paragraph number. “SBN” refers to the old Selby-Bigge Nidditch editions of the Treatise and the Enquiries.

  2. I ask the reader to take into consideration that this is an introduction to a primarily historical paper. So it will not be necessary to go into all the details of the contemporary positions.

  3. Here, I am considering their theories together although there are significant differences in the details between them.

  4. This is merely a simple example where all the tropes of a simple substance (no other substances as its parts) are necessary to it. It does not have to be so. Simon's and Keinänen's theories can accommodate cases where there are also tropes contingent to a simple substance. Yet, these tropes are rigidly existentially dependent on the necessary tropes, which are, in turn, generically existentially dependent on the contingent tropes. So there can be qualitative change according to Simons and Keinänen.

  5. It may also be called non-identity as if x and y are really distinct; they are not really identical.

  6. Here, I leave the modality in terms of which rigid existential dependence/independence is stated open on purpose. I will specify it in Hume's case below.

  7. This is relatively neutral on how Hume's complex perceptions should be understood. Even Donald L.M. Baxter, who has denied that complex perceptions are single entities in Hume's view, subscribes to it. According to Baxter, complex perceptions are merely many things occurring together without forming any individuals (Baxter 2007, 25–8). By contrast, Garrett thinks that they are individuals consisting of simple perceptions as their ultimate proper parts (Garrett 1997, 61–4 and 68–75).

  8. This cannot be challenged by the fact that in the footnote at T 1.1.7.7 (SBN 20–1), which Hume inserted into the Appendix to T 3, he says that simple ideas may have different points or circumstances of resemblance. Later in the footnote, he is explicit that the “very nature” of simple ideas “excludes all composition” (T 1.n.5App; SBN 637). Garrett has also pointed out that simple ideas may have aspects because it is possible that they bear different resemblances to distinct ideas (1997, 63). But the point is that then they are not conceived in themselves, separately from everything else.

  9. See also 1.2.1.2-5; SBN 26–8, 1.2.2.9; SBN 32, 1.2.3.12-5; SBN 38–9, 1.2.4.1; SBN 39, 1.2.5.12; SBN 57–8, 1.4.4.8; SBN 228 and 1.4.5.9; SBN 235. In addition, Hume says that visual and tactile simple perceptions are mathematical points (T 1.2.4.3; SBN 40 and 21; SBN 46–7) and his definition of a mathematical point is “neither length, breadth nor depth”. (T 1.2.4.9; SBN 42) Therefore, he must think—in order to be consistent—that visual and tactile simple perceptions are spatially actually indivisible. T 1.4.5.9 (SBN 235) confirms that he actually thinks so: “Whatever marks the place of its existence either must be extended, or must be a mathematical point, without parts or composition”.

  10. It would be an interesting question of Lewis scholarship whether he was influenced by Hume on space in his thesis of Humean Supervenience.

  11. Hume rules the possibility out that spatial simple perceptions (visual and tactile) can be in the same place at the same time (T 1.2.4.4-7; SBN 40–2 and 1.4.4.9-12; SBN 228–30). For this very reason, mere simultaneity cannot make simple perceptions compositionally overlapping, since co-existing simple perceptions must be in different places or not in space at all.

  12. See also T 1.2.1.3-4; SBN 27.

  13. At the same time, it establishes Hume's view against Berkeley, for example, that simple perceptions do not need anything to support them, such as a substantial soul.

  14. This is independent of the question whether Hume is a Metaphysical Realist or not—whether he believes in the existence of perception-independent entities or not. Neither does it mean a commitment to some form of representational realism. It only says that if there is such a property beyond perceptions and if the impression represents it, then the property is also ontologically independent. It might presuppose something about the nature of representation though, but that question is out of the scope of this paper.

  15. T 1.1.7.6; SBN 19–20, 1.2.4.11; SBN 43, 1.2.2.8; SBN 32, 1.4.5.5; SBN 233, App. 12; SBN 634, 1.2.2.8; SBN 32 and 1.3.3.3; SBN 79–80

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  1. Academy of Finland/School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Philosophy, University of Tampere, 33014, Tampereen yliopisto, Finland

    Jani Hakkarainen

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Hakkarainen, J. Hume’s Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties. Int Ontology Metaphysics 12, 197–212 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0087-1

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