John Culp opens this issue by offering an approach to the problem of evil that attempts to bring theoretical and practical approaches into reciprocal interaction. Such interaction between theoretical and practical responses opens a way of addressing challenges related to the idea that God alone can overcome evil. Process theists, for example, modify the traditional theories of divine omnipotence. This theoretical change in the concept of omnipotence opens ways in which it makes sense to say that God needs and welcomes the practical help of human agents in defeating evil. Again, in the interactive view, God is not alone in fighting evil; rather, armed with a new theory of divine omnipotence, human agents are invited to join hands with God in their practical efforts to overcome (or at least reduce) evil.

In our second paper, Gerrit Neel examines Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN). He contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how we are to interpret the probabilities at issue in Plantinga’s argument. Neels argues that Plantinga has a limited view of the range of interpretations available to him on this issue. Neels points out that, e.g. objective probabilities are not suitable for Plantinga’s argument. As well, permissive subjective probabilities leave out many of Plantinga’s interlocutors. The upshot is that the EAAN is more limited in its applicability than Plantinga alleges.

In the next article, Joshua Sijuwade seeks to provide a response to the Aloneness Argument Against Classical Theism proposed by Joseph C. Schmid and Ryan T. Mullins. Schmid and Mullins provide a reductio of 'classical theism'. In particular, they argue that there is a logical inconsistency in the following three claims: (1) God is simple; (2) God is omniscient; and (3) God is free not to create. The author agrees, given the way that Schmid and Mullins fill out these terms—which is perfectly in line with the way that these terms have been understood by 'classical theists' up until now—are jointly logically inconsistent. However, according to the author, 'classical theists' can modify their account of (1) in a way that restores consistency. This does not involve a dramatic departure from earlier formulations of 'classical theism'. In order to construct this revised account, the author draws upon (A) Don Baxter's account of aspects; (B) Kit Fine's account of essential properties; and (C) his own account of divine simplicity (which is grounded in Baxter's account of aspects).

In the last article, Howard-Snyder and McKaughan formulate a theory of relational faith according to which it is fundamentally, resilient reliance, i.e., a disposition to rely with resilience in the face of challenges to doing so, and a theory of relational faithfulness according to which it is, fundamentally, resilient reliability. The authors claim that religious faith (faith in God) has the same structure as faith found in cultural, entertainment, political, or sporting contexts. This disposition of resilient faith naturally extends to manifestations of faith in ideals and causes, propositional faith, and life-unifying faith. This theory of faith also plausibly solves traditional problems of faith—e.g., the problem of faith as a virtue, or the problem of faith and reason. It provides new plausible solutions to problems in other areas of philosophy, whether in the philosophy of religion, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, or in therapy and counseling.