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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions

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  • © 2023

Overview

  • Illustrates the connection between thought experiments and intuitions within philosophy
  • Focuses on paradigmatic thought experiments within epistemology
  • Offers both a thinly conceptual and argument friendly view of intuition

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series (PSSP, volume 150)

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Table of contents (4 chapters)

Keywords

About this book

This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology. 

Authors and Affiliations

  • Institut für Philosophie, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Manhal Hamdo

About the author

Manhal Hamdo is a postdoctoral research fellow at Freie Universität Berlin - Institut für Philosophie. His key focus is analytic philosophy, primarily epistemic intuition, thought experiments, knowledge skepticism, and the self. He wrote his PhD dissertation, published various papers, and participated in several conferences on intuition.

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions

  • Authors: Manhal Hamdo

  • Series Title: Philosophical Studies Series

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33480-1

  • Publisher: Springer Cham

  • eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)

  • Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-031-33479-5Published: 29 June 2023

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-031-33482-5Due: 30 July 2023

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-031-33480-1Published: 28 June 2023

  • Series ISSN: 0921-8599

  • Series E-ISSN: 2542-8349

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: XVIII, 178

  • Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy, general, Analytic Philosophy

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