Abstract
We encounter the notion of coherence in many branches of philosophy. This overview introduces some basic distinctions that can be used to characterize concepts of coherence. After that, two formal frameworks for the analysis of coherence are introduced. The first of these is based on the logic of support relations. It is used to show that coherentism and foundationalism may be combinable rather than antithetical. The second framework assumes that coherence comes in degrees and that it can be measured in probability-based units. The properties of such measures is discussed, and so are the difficulties in constructing a measure of coherence that satisfies intuitively reasonable constraints.
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Notes
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- 2.
S is irreflexive, i.e. ¬(xSx) holds for all x.
- 3.
Alternative, stronger conditions are discussed in [11].
- 4.
Olsson introduced his measure in a framework where coherence is a property of reports, typically coming from different sources. (Bovens and Hartmann did the same.) Presentation-sensitivity is thus explicitly assumed.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Erik Olsson for very useful comments on an earlier version of this text.
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Hansson, S.O. (2018). Coherence. In: Hansson, S., Hendricks, V. (eds) Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_23
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