Abstract
In these brief remarks, I want to indicate why conceptual analyses by philosophers are unlikely to deliver those sorts of a priori connections that Jackson argues areneeded for armchair metaphysics (Jackson, ‘Armchair Metaphysics’, this volume).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Grice, H.P. and Strawson, P.F. (1965), ‘In defense of a dogma’, Philosophical Review 65.
Harman, G. (1967), ‘Quine on meaning and existence, I: The death of meaning’, Review of Metaphysics 21, pp. 124–151.
Harman, G. (1973), Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Peirce, C.S. (1955),‘Some consequences of four incapacities’, in Justis Buchler (ed.) Philosophical Writings of Peirce (New York: Dover), pp. 228–229.
Putnam, H. ‘It Ain’t Necessarily So’, Journal of Philosophy 59, pp. 658–671.
Quine, W.V. (1936), ‘Truth by Convention’, in O. H. Lee, (ed.) Philosophical Essays for A. N. Whitehead (New York: Longman’s).
Quine, W. V. (1953), ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).
Winograd, T. and Flores, C. F. Understanding Computers and Cognition: Language and Being, (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Pub. Corp.).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Harman, G. (1994). Doubts About Conceptual Analysis. In: Michael, M., O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. (eds) Philosophy in Mind. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 60. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1008-2_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-010-4438-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-011-1008-2
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive