Franciscan Studies

TRUTH, THE AID, NOT THE OBSTACLE TO VIRTUE Some months ago I happened to read an article that was published a few years ago in the Jesuit quarterly, THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. Its author, Rev. John Connery, S. J., proposed in his article to explain the Thomistic doctrine concerning the role of prudence in the moral life of man.1 That Father Connery consulted some of the works of Aquinas in preparing his article is incontestible to anyone who will take the trouble to read it. But that the Jesuit reproduced faithfully the thought of St. Thomas on some points essential to the proper function of prudence is very contestible. So much so, that I have set myself to the task of demonstrating that to reproduce the doctrinal thought of another, especially that of a medieval theologian, it is not at all sufficient to reproduce his words, even though it be done with a goodly number of references. I have chosen as the title of my effort, "TRUTH, THE AID, NOT THE OBSTACLE TO VIRTUE," because, it seems to me, Father Connery's basic error stems from a misconception concerning the distinction between speculative and practical truth, an error which results in an attenuation, if not an annihilation, of the role of truth in the moral life of man. He not only distinguishes speculative truth from practical truth, a distinction for which he certainly has a warranty in many of the works of St. Thomas,2 but he does more—and for this he has no warranty. He sets up an irreconciliable opposition between them that culminates in the assertion: "Virtue is more important than speculative truth,3 so that, if one cannot be sure of both, virtue is to be preferred. St. Thomas was clever enough to see how passion could use a false devotion to speculative truth as a pretext to achieve its own 1 "Prudence and Morality," THEOLOGICAL STUDIES, Vol. XIII, No. 4, pp. 564—582. 2 S. T. I q. 14, a. 16, corp; De Ver. q. 3, a. 3, corp; De Virt. in Comm. a. 6, corp; In VI Eth. lect. 2, nos. 1132—1135; in III De Anima, lect. 15, no. 820; in II Meta. lect. 2, no. 290; in HI Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, ad 2. 3 The position Father Connery defends, curiously enough, is, by implication , contrary to that of all the spiritual writers of the Ignatian school, who stress the necessity of contemplation for progress in virtue. Speculative truth is the object of contemplation. ??J. J. HARTNETT satisfaction, and he properly diagnosed such a course of action as a departure from virtue rather than an approach to truth."4 It is a pity that Father Connery fails to cite the text of St. Thomas justifying such an opposition between virtue and truth, for by so doing he unwittingly creates in the mind of the reader the suspicion that he is employing the great prestige enjoyed by St. Thomas in the field of Catholic Theology to confirm an opinion that is peculiarly his own. As a matter of fact, St. Thomas, instead of opposing truth and virtue, couples them in an association of mutual assistance to each other. In the very first Book of his great Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle, the Angelic Doctor takes a position diametrically contrary to the one espoused by Father Connery. For he categorically asserts that devotion to truth, far from being a guise for vice, is of the utmost necessity for the preservation of virtue, even though such a devotion involves a strain on friendship: "For it will seem better, that is more upright, pertinent to morality, and absolutely obligatory, that a man should not fear to assail his friends in defense of the truth. Such a procedure is so necessary to morality that without it virtue cannot be preserved . . . This duty is especially incumbent upon philosophers, whose profession is wisdom, or knowledge of the truth."5 There is in reality, therefore, no opposition in the doctrine of St.Thomas between virtue and truth, but, as we shall see in the course of this paper, a mutually harmonious relationship grounded in the...