Abstract
This paper focuses on one of the major controversies of collective action, i.e. Shared Agency. The objective of my paper is to explain the relevance of Shared Agency in the Theory of Collective Action where I have dealt with questions like—Is it possible to consider one as an agent or as the same agent when she performs in a shared action? How can we talk of shared agency, even when an action is being performed by different individuals in a group or of a group? Where is the notion of “agency” located in a shared action? Based on the seminal paper, “Shared Intention” by Michael Bratman, my objective here is to present and analyse the notion of shared agency in terms of meshing sub-plans and the impossibility of reducing the agency displayed in a shared action to a mere summation of intentions of individual agents, where the essence of shared agency lies in cooperation.
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Hazarika, L. Michael Bratman: The Notion of Shared Agency in Meshing Sub-plans. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 41, 83–92 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00314-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-023-00314-z