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Epistemic Responsibility for Undesirable Beliefs

  • Book
  • © 2023

Overview

Authors:
  1. Deborah K. Heikes

    1. Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama - Huntsville, Huntsville, USA

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  • Considers how racist and sexist beliefs can be held to be genuinely undesirable in a world of post-truth and alt-facts

  • Addresses epistemic involuntarism and whether individuals are responsible for their racist and sexist beliefs

  • Examines the nature of epistemic responsibility for social epistemologists who treat ignorance as socially constructed

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Table of contents (5 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-viii
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  2. Epistemic Responsibility: An Overview

    • Deborah K. Heikes
    Pages 1-33

  3. What Is Undesirable Belief?

    • Deborah K. Heikes
    Pages 35-85

  4. Can There Be Epistemic Responsibility?

    • Deborah K. Heikes
    Pages 87-142

  5. What About the Exculpatory Effects of Ignorance?

    • Deborah K. Heikes
    Pages 143-192

  6. It’s Not My Fault

    • Deborah K. Heikes
    Pages 193-224

  7. Back Matter

    Pages 225-233
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Keywords

About this book

This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an “undesirable belief” will differ among various epistemic communities; second, it is not clear what responsibility we have for beliefs simpliciter; and third, inherent in discussions of socially constructed ignorance (like white ignorance) is the idea that society is structured in such a way that white people are made deliberately unaware of their ignorance, which suggests their racial beliefs are not epistemically blameworthy.   

This book explores each of these topics with the aim of establishing the nature of undesirable beliefs and our responsibility for these beliefs with the understanding that there may well be (rare) occasions when undesirable beliefs are not epistemically culpable. 

Authors and Affiliations

  • Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama - Huntsville, Huntsville, USA

    Deborah K. Heikes

About the author

Deborah K. Heikes is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.

Bibliographic Information

  • Book Title: Epistemic Responsibility for Undesirable Beliefs

  • Authors: Deborah K. Heikes

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41858-7

  • Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham

  • eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)

  • Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023

  • Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-031-41857-0Published: 22 September 2023

  • Softcover ISBN: 978-3-031-41860-0Due: 06 October 2024

  • eBook ISBN: 978-3-031-41858-7Published: 21 September 2023

  • Edition Number: 1

  • Number of Pages: VIII, 233

  • Topics: Epistemology, Ethics, Social Philosophy

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