Abstract
The Animal Rights Thesis (ART) entails that nonhuman animals like pigs and cows have moral rights, including rights not to be unjustly harmed. If ART is true, it appears to imply the permissibility of killing ranchers, farmers, and zookeepers in defense of animals who will otherwise be unjustly killed. This is the Militancy Objection (MO) to ART. I consider four replies to MO and reject three of them. First, MO fails because animals lack rights, or lack rights of sufficient strength to justify other-defensive killing. Second, MO fails because those who unjustly threaten animals aren't liable or, if they are liable, their liability is outweighed by other considerations (e.g., a strong presumption against vigilante killing). I then argue both of these fail. Third, MO succeeds because animal militancy is permissible. Fourth, MO fails because there aren't liability justifications for defensive killing in general (i.e., pacifism is true). I argue that there's thoroughgoing epistemic parity between the Militancy View (MV) and the Pacifist View (PV), and that two considerations favor PV over MV. First, because under conditions of uncertainty, we should believe rights-bearers retain rather than lose their rights, which PV affirms and MV denies. Second, because PV is intrinsically likelier than MV to be true since PV at worst affirms wrongful letting die and MV at worst affirms wrongful killing, the latter of which is intrinsically harder to justify than the former.
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Notes
Though as Abbate (2015a) powerfully shows, the nature of the justification for defensively harming nonhuman animals isn’t clear.
My argument, which I lack the space to develop fully here, is that mere failure to assist can make one liable to defensive harm. Here’s why: If you fail to help someone under threat of unjust harm H when you could reasonably do so (i.e., when it’s feasible and at little cost to you), then you share responsibility for the fact that H isn’t no longer a threat to that person, which entails that you are responsible for the fact that H is still a threat to that person, which entails that you bear some responsibility for the fact that the threat imposed by H is maintained. Since the threatened person has a reasonable claim against you that you not maintain threats, you are liable to defensive harm if you fail to help them when you reasonably could. Moreover, since you can’t be liable for acting permissibly and since every act is either permissible or impermissible, it follows that you acted impermissibly. Thus, you have an obligation to assist them resulting from a claim they have against you—which is identical to a right to assistance. For similar views, see Aas (2021) and Hanser (1999).
The full story can be viewed here: https://abc13.com/man-arrested-after-doorbell-cam-captures-dog-being-choked/6182160/.
For an extended defense of this view, see Gunasekera (2018): 93–102.
An anonymous reviewer objects that the necessity condition isn’t satisfied. After all, the activists might discharge their obligation to rescue nonhuman animals by pursuing effective forms of nonviolent activism. This reveals two applications of the necessity condition: whether violence is necessary to save some animals and whether it’s necessary to save these animals. I have stipulated that violence is necessary to save these animals in the Zookeeper case and cases like it, but perhaps this misfocuses the moral problem (and its solution). I disagree. Suppose I encounter a human child about to be brutally murdered. I can either kill the unjust aggressor and save the child, or I can donate to Oxfam and save one child’s life, but I can’t do both. (Perhaps the donation window is closing at Oxfam and ‘rushed funds’ are needed to save a child by day’s end.) Surely I am at least permitted to save the child about to be brutally murdered, which is all the permission thesis requires. The necessity condition is satisfied for the same reason under the assistance thesis, though then we must adjudicate between competing rights to assistance. If donating to the Animal Legal Defense Fund saves some animals whereas killing Nour saves these animals, we might look to lesser-evil considerations to resolve the impasse. If the impasse is theoretically unresolvable and our obligation to assist can be discharged equally well under either action, then there’s no obligation to save some animals over these animals (or vice-versa), thereby ensuring that the necessity condition is satisfied under either course of action under the assistance thesis.
Think, for example, of naval personnel who utilize dolphins to identify mines, or ground forces which utilize canines and other animals to detect explosives. Similar arrangements are made by police personnel (e.g., K-9 units).
I say “perhaps” since poachers are less likely to be viewed favorably under commonsense moral views.
Abbate considers a case in which a human man hikes on a wilderness trail where grizzlies are known to roam. He comes across a grizzly, the grizzly growls, and the man fatally shoots the grizzly. Abbate describes this case as one in which the hiker engaged in and is responsible for risk-taking activities which resulted in a foreseeable violent conflict. Because the risk-imposition is non-reciprocal—that is, because “the hiker could have stayed home” and “the bear cannot be expected to just ‘stay in his den’”—the hiker is liable to defensive harm to an extent that the grizzly is not. Thus, the hiker, and not the grizzly, should bear the brunt of the ensuing harm. See Abbate (2015a: 122–124).
Cf. Ebert & Machan (2012). Ebert and Machan focus on a distinct objection, which they call the Predation Objection. According to this objection, the animal rights thesis implies that agents have a duty to defend animals from predation by other animals, which they claim is absurd. In the course of defending this objection, they note that since Regan denies that there is a duty to defend animals from such predation on the grounds that animals are ‘moral patients’ and therefore cannot violate rights, it follows that it is impermissible to harm or kill animals in defense of humans. They then claim such a view also implies that if, for example, a wolf attacks a human and the human responds with violent self-defense, it is permissible to harm or kill the human in defense of the wolf’s rights. This is notable for two reasons. First, it shows that the animal rights thesis pro tanto justifies animal rights militancy. Second, it portrays this implication as problematic. Under my formulation of the Militancy Objection, however, the assistance thesis explicitly restricts the scope of the right to defensive assistance to averting unjustified harms, which excludes the harms posed by nonhuman animals (and, for that matter, even human animals) who lack moral agency. For a fresh revisitation of this topic, see Abbate (2020). Notably, Abbate claims there is sometimes a moral obligation to harm some animals to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals.
See also McMahan’s objection to Judith Jarvis Thomson in McMahan (2002: 398-421). Thomson assumes for argument’s sake that fetuses have strong rights and argues that abortion is nevertheless often permissible. McMahan replies that such a strong view of rights implies that a third party can permissibly defend fetuses under immediate threat of abortion.
Speciesists will doubtlessly defend an asymmetry here, contending that human slaves are importantly different from animals, such that ascriptions of rights are not undermined by the permitting of widespread violence in the case of slaves but are undermined in the case of animals. But that’s just to offer a distinct objection to the animal rights thesis.
I assume internalism about defensive liability merely for the sake of argument. According to internalism, Threat is liable to be harmed only if harming Threat would be necessary to avert some harm, narrowly proportionate, etc. In other words, these requirements are ‘internal’ to liability; someone isn’t liable without meeting the requirements. For more on this distinction, see Frowe (2014: 88–89 and 91–94).
For an insightful critique of Regan’s conclusions about the Lifeboat Dogs case, see Abbate (2015b).
Cf. McMahan (2016).
Notably, McMahan (2002: 420) condemns animal rights militancy for these reasons.
This example is a more described variant of an example given in McMahan (2005).
For those keeping track of the math, that’s a combined 40 years for the elderly pedestrians and another 80 years for Driver. Since imposing 80 years of lost life is twice as bad as imposing 40 years of lost life, preventing the latter by causing the former appears to violate narrow proportionality.
Gordon-Solmon (2017: 127, fn. 8) suggests that responsibility is internal to, or necessary for, narrow proportionality. I’m assuming the same is true of degrees of responsibility with respect to what counts as narrowly proportionate (or disproportionate) in a given case.
Nozick (2013: 41) claims it’s impermissible to inflict slight discomfort on a human in order to spare 10,000 animals from extreme suffering. Nozick makes this claim as an example of what we’re forbidden to do to non-liable parties. He makes no claim about what we may do to liable parties, such as Nour. The same is true of Regan in his comments on the Lifeboat Dogs case: He claims no amount of animal sacrifice is disproportionate, but he fails to consider liable parties like Nour whose interests are discounted.
There may be other ways of denying or weakening the animal rights thesis. I lack the space to explore them here.
Any plausible moral theory on which the animal rights thesis is true will condemn Nour’s actions, since her actions would be morally comparable to someone guarding a prison filled with humans who will shortly be unjustly killed.
It’s thus an assumption of the diminished liability approach that it’s impermissible to defend human slaves even if pacifism is false. As I argue below, this is false. Slaves are permitted to defend themselves with violence, if anyone is.
A stronger variation of the vigilante principle might be that such violence is permissible only if it would be unlikely to bring about worse injustices. On this interpretation of the moral requirement, a mere lack of a positive likelihood is insufficient. What’s needed is a negative likelihood (i.e., an unlikelihood). Thus, in cases where the probability of bringing about greater injustices hovers at 0.5, or where there is no better reason to believe that greater injustices will be brought about than that they won’t be, it’s wrong (on the stronger vigilante principle) for third parties to engage in defensive violence.
Or, per the above footnote, it’s unlikely to bring about worse injustices.
Might B mistakenly believe that employing x will prevent z? No, because (per Uniacke’s stipulation) B knows that x won’t prevent z. Imagine that B used something else he believed wouldn’t help him successfully defend against z, like singing opera. If B sang opera, would he be employing it as a defensive measure? The answer, it seems to me, is that he obviously wouldn’t be.
This implication, too, strikes me as counterintuitive. John Brown fought in defense of slaves, acting more or less precisely as Rowlands envisions. It seems to me that if pacifism is false, then Brown surely acted permissibly.
A war in defense of mistreated animals might in some ways be easier to wage permissibly than a war in defense of slaves. Concerns about wide proportionality, for example, would be less of a concern, since there were millions of slaves but billions of abused animals. This will effectively permit a larger number of non-liable persons to be (unintentionally) killed, since the number of animals who would be saved would be considerably larger.
If the vigilante principle did condemn animal rights warfare in Canadian War, it would also condemn the war waged by the Northern States in American Civil War, which is implausible.
Kagan (2019: 255) signals an openness to this view. For the fuller discussion, see 252–258.
Perhaps we should distinguish between posing a threat and aiding a threat. But even if we do, aiding a threat is surely going to entail liability to defensive harm, at least when one aids a threat in a morally responsible way, as Nour does. For example, perhaps only Assassin threatens to kill you with a gun, but I hold you in place for the kill shot. Moreover, perhaps I am unaware that Assassin is acting wrongly in doing so—for example, perhaps I mistake Assassin for a police officer doing their duty.
See, for example, section 3.2 where the solipsist and the person uneducated about human rights provide examples of appeals to ignorance. It seems to me that both persons are culpably ignorant because two reasonable pro tanto reasonable expectations are that individuals recognize that there are sentient individuals distinct from themselves and that it’s impermissible to harm such individuals without a sufficiently good reason. It also seems to me that neo-Cartesian views of animals are false and obviously so, or at the very least that it’s reasonable to expect most humans to recognize animal sentience since we think it’s reasonable to hold most humans morally and legally responsible for animal abuse. However, I can’t defend these positions at length here. These disputes are somewhat peripheral, however, since it seems permissible to harm the convinced solipsist whether or not they are culpably ignorant. The same, therefore, will be true of the lookout, Nour, certain animal researchers, and so on.
Someone is liable to harm just in case you would not wrong them by harming them. Thus, even if you harm a liable individual and thus don’t wrong them, you might in doing so still wrong someone else, and thus it might be impermissible to harm the liable individual. Moreover, even if it’s permissible to harm someone, it doesn’t follow that they’re liable to be harmed. For example, it might be permissible to harm them as an unintended side effect of preventing some immense harm. For more on distinction between liability and permissibility, see Frowe (2014: 188).
Hadley’s appeal to factors like contributory causation appear to commit him to the view that it is the number of liable individuals that generates the counterintuitive nature of the Militancy Objection. Indeed, in his abstract, he refers to the problem as the Multiple Inappropriate Targets Problem. Whereas Hadley and I differ in our interpretation of the problematic nature of the Militancy Objection, our interpretations are not incompatible. Moreover, Hadley’s concerns appear to overlap with a similar problem in the broader literature on the ethics of self-defense. See Hadley (2009a: 168). For more on the more general problem, see McMahan (2011: 24).
Here’s an objection: Militancy doesn’t permit us to kill all of these people (or people in comparable professions), since doing so would in many cases be disproportionate to the harms they threaten to impose on animals. For example, some animal researchers neither kill nor physically injure animals. At most, they imprison animals. Killing those animal researchers to free the imprisoned animals, then, would be objectionably disproportionate. But this objection fails for two reasons. First, the objection relies on the dubious assumption that killing (for example) kidnappers is objectionably disproportionate. It isn’t at all obvious that human abductees aren’t permitted to kill their kidnappers if doing so is necessary to escape. Second, the objection assumes that the intuitive implausibility of the militancy view is restricted to its moral implications for killing, but that’s false. Suppose that Nour was guarding not animals who will soon be killed but animals who will soon be tortured, and that in order to rescue them it’s necessary to torture Nour. The view that Nour is liable to such harm is again counterintuitive.
If pacifism is true, is anyone liable to defensive harm? As I pointed out in footnote 59, liability doesn’t entail actual permissibility (and nor does actual permissibility entail liability). By implication, impermissibility does not entail non-liability. Thus, even if pacifism entails that assault is always impermissible, it doesn’t follow that no one is liable to defensive assault.
Does pacifism falsify the Permission Thesis? As stated, the Permission Thesis merely claims that there’s a third-party permission to defend animals. Typically, invoking a permission to other-defense is a way of invoking a permission to other-defensive assault. On that reading, pacifism falsifies the Permission Thesis. However, since there are substantive ways of defending others that do not involve assault, it seems that pacifism does not rule out every form of other-defense, and thus is compatible with a broader interpretation of the Permission Thesis.
The number also reflects only crimes that actually occurred, and thus excludes attempted but unsuccessful violent crimes.
This criticism is from Narveson (2003), who argues that pacifists “have too many friends” and “terrorists” (which I’m calling “militants”) “have too many enemies.” On Narveson’s view, terrorism is wrong as a conceptual matter, since it condones the targeting of noncombatants who are not liable to defensive (or offensive) harm. Again, the worry here is not that the sheer number of persons liable to be defensively harmed is too many, as if there were some numerical threshold above which there is no liability to defensive harm. Rather, the worry is that these people don’t seem to be liable to defensive harm at all, and since the militancy view implies otherwise in so many cases, it gets the wrong judgment in an immense number of cases.
Helen Frowe (in conversation) objects that the epistemic par isn’t apparent. She concedes that there might be epistemic parity ‘downstream’, at the level of applied cases, but denies that there’s epistemic parity ‘upstream’, at the level of broad principles and ethical theory. Sometimes we use the independent plausibility of cases to determine the plausibility of moral theories and principles, and sometimes we use the independent plausibility of moral theories and principles to guide us through hard cases. Frowe claims we should rely on the independent plausibility of liability, like we did with the Burning Barn case in section §2, to guide us through hard cases like Zookeeper. Once we do, militancy will be the more plausible view. I can’t offer an extensive reply here, but I’ll offer one reply. Where militancy and pacifism part ways is at the crossroads of liability, and so (unless we’re to beg the question against either view) we need to look elsewhere for an independently plausible moral theory or principle that advantages militancy. Where might it be? So far as I can tell, the sort of ‘pre-liability’ moral story of the militancy view is the very same moral story as pacifism: Both accept that Nour and the pigs have rights, that there’s a pro tanto obligation against transgressing them, and so on. But if that’s true, then the epistemic parity appears thoroughgoing: There’s intuitive parity downstream with liability, and there’s parity upstream due to identical background moral assumptions.
For her reply to the Taxpayer Objection, see Frowe (2014: 209–212).
That is, assuming my arguments in Sect. 3.1 are successful.
Here’s another objection: Our background knowledge also tells us that the human aggressor is aggressing unjustly, which is reason enough to prefer militancy over pacifism. But the objection fails because knowing that someone acts unjustly isn’t sufficient to know they’re liable to defensive harm or that it’s permissible to kill them. For example, I might know that you acted unjustly by failing to pay someone what you owed them, but I don’t thereby know that you’re liable to defensive harm or that it’s permissible to kill you.
It’s unclear to me whether this is logically distinct from the claim that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Rachels (1986) compares two examples in which you either drown your cousin or let him drown. He affirms both are impermissible but denies one violation is intrinsically worse than the other. Quinn (1989: 289) argues that even if Rachels is right that neither violation is worse than the other, it doesn’t follow that the permissibility thresholds are the same.
This is a modified version of Singer’s (1972: 231) classic case.
Cf. Tadros (2011: 252). Thomson (1971: 52) defends the stronger view that if even your bodily liberty is at stake, such that it’s necessary for you to remain plugged into a violinist for nine months to save his life, that’s sufficient to justify not saving his life because the cost to you is too great.
For similar cases and discussion, see Frowe (2014: 51–71).
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This paper was graciously awarded the 2019 Frank Chapman Sharp Memorial Prize for the best essay on the ethics of war and peace. My thanks to Helen Frowe, Seth Lazar, Suzanne Uniacke, Holly Lawford-Smith, Jeff Sebo, Nathan Nobis, Mylan Engel Jr., Cheryl Abbate, John Hadley, Chris Cuomo, Paul Tubig, Karen Emmerman, Michael Blake, my students at the Washington Corrections Center for Women, and an anonymous reviewer at this journal for feedback and helpful conversation. Thanks also to those present at the 2017 Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals Inaugural Workshop at the University of Colorado, the Stockholm Center for the Ethics of War and Peace Graduate Reading Retreat at the Australian National University (Kioloa campus), and the invited symposium “Animal Rights Terrorism and Pacifism” at the 2017 APA Eastern Division Meeting in Savannah, Georgia. Shortly thereafter, on 22 February 2018, the paper was featured on the Blog of the APA. My thanks to the APA for featuring it and for those who commented.
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Hereth, B. Animal rights Pacifism. Philos Stud 178, 4053–4082 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01636-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01636-x