Coordination Theory

Abstract

The role of pure coordination in Schelling’s early work was to provide an analytical model capable of extension and application to bargaining problems more generally:

[Pure] coordination-theory, while interesting in its own right, is interesting mainly for the light it sheds on the nature of the mixed-motive game. (Schelling, 1960, p. 99).

On way to realize this program would be to build up a theory of pure coordination for cases in which interests concur, and then extend this theory in some way to a more general class of situations in which coordination manages somehow to coexists with strategic deliberation and bargaining maeuvers. Following Schelling’s lead, what may be sought out as common to many of these situations are characteristic patterns of reasoning: deliberation geared to ‘drawing expectations to a foucs’ (Schelling, 1960, p. 68).

Work on this paper was begun with the assistance of a Canada Council Leave Fellowship. In later stages it has benefited from advice and suggestions by David Lewis, David Gauthier, Howard Sobel, and Thomas Schelling.