Abstract
In multiple parts of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant describes how time is dependent on space – which is the fundament of his distinction between inner and outer sense. However, he does not provide us with an argument for this dependency. In this article, two reasons for this dependency thesis are introduced. The first one aims at providing a conceptual link between time and space but runs into conflict with the Transcendental Aesthetic. The second one shifts our focus from the conceptual level to a priori possible objects of experience: Time cannot provide such objects, which are different from our subjective states due to its one-dimensionality. Only space makes such objects possible.
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