Abstract
I argue that the separation of the conjoined Attard twins of Manchester was not morally justified as it involved intentionally internally affecting (“invading”) the body of the weaker twin without permission and without any advantage to her.
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Hill, D.J. The Morality of the Separation of the Conjoined Attard Twins of Manchester. Health Care Anal 13, 163–176 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-005-6442-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-005-6442-z