Abstract
Philosophical accounts of visual perception have long had to contend with questions of perceptual relativity: visual phenomenology seems to be influenced by factors independent of the objective properties of the external objects we perceive. More recently, a host of such examples has emerged from psychological studies on visual attention. In two prominent accounts of the consequences of this research, Block (2010, 2015) argues that these effects occur without changes in the way one visually represents the world to be. If true, this would undermine representationalist accounts of the phenomenology of perception, which share a commitment to the claim that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Block’s thesis is based on experiments involving non-selective attention, and he draws the metaphysical conclusion that the resources representationalists need to distinguish veridical from illusory perception are nonexistent. The empirical evidence he considers is highly compelling, as is the ‘landscape’ model of attention that appears to underwrite it. However, in discussing these issues, Block also considers a representative example of selective attention, wherein he concedes a point that provides grounds for a plausible representationalist response. I assemble and assess this response, revealing the contradiction at the heart of Block’s thesis, and conclude, that the representationalist should remain unmoved.
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Notes
I shall continue to use this term, although Block (2010) uses the term ‘representationism,’ instead.
Block rejects the notion that the relation is one of supervenience, and favors, instead, the notion of ‘grounding’ (see his 2015, for details). Nonetheless, representationalists often formulate their position on the basis of supervenience, and nothing hangs on it for my argumentative position.
Block explicitly aims his arguments at representationalist and direct realists, alike. In what follows, I focus solely on the implications of his thesis for representationalism.
In fact, I will also argue that his treatment of non-selective attention is inconsistent, and thus, that problems arising for his thesis, in relation to selective attention, first appear – in a slightly different form – in one of his examples of non-selective attention, too.
In his 2015, Block claims that both peripheral and unattended perception produce the same results. But I ignore them in what follows. Block provides no evidence that peripheral vision occurs without attention. And the notion that any conscious perception occurs without attention is, itself, a vexed philosophical issue (e.g., Hine 2010; and Prinz 2011). Indeed, Block’s own ‘no illusion’ argument relies on the notion that at least some attention is required for conscious perception.
Block is careful to acknowledge the scale and complexity of these issues.
This is actually the second example of non-selective attention that Block uses to make his case. I’m inverting their order in an effort to establish, and clarify, my own account.
Eye tracking techniques are employed to ensure that subjects do not move their eyes. Nevertheless, the cue presentations are quicker than subjects can move their eyes.
In fact, as Block acknowledges, attention may well involve an apparent contrast increase in one patch, and an apparent decrease in the other. See Carasco et al. (2004) for details of this effect.
Importantly, for the thesis of this paper, the difference here is actually between more vs. less attended, rather than unattended patches. See Block (2010, p. 44)
This is not the case for any actual contrast difference. See Carasco et al. (2004) for details.
Covert attention, an empirically well-supported phenomenon, involves changing where one visually attends without thereby moving one’s eyes.
See Block (2010) for the relevant citations.
Again, it’s likely that this is a case of more vs. less attended, rather than attended vs. unattended. See fn.7, above.
This is the first of three reasons that Block offers for using the example in the first place. The third is that it allows one to practice covert attention, which is, “… moving attention independently of fixation … [.]” (Block 2010. P. 33).
See fn. 17, above.
This is the term that Block uses for what I’m calling ‘representationalism.’
Block looks at this case of non-selective attention before the Gabor patch examples (surveyed in §2 and §3, above).
This appears in §3 of his 2010, before he focuses on this case of non-selective attention, which appears in the following section.
See §6, below.
Block looks at these examples before focusing on non-selective attention. Once again, I’m re-arranging their order for argumentative clarity.
Hill (2016) exploits a different version of this distinction to propose an impure representationalist response to these (and other) issues raised by the effects of attention on visual perception. See §5.2, below.
Prettyman (2019), argues that the relevant distinction between perception and misperception, here, is not one of just accuracy but also precision, thus visual illusions are both inaccurate and imprecise.
Carrasco (2014) provides some interesting examples of such cases.
Hill is responding, here, to superficially similar points made by Prettyman (2017b).
This is exactly the issue raised by Block’s ‘no illusion’ argument, canvassed at the end of §3, above.
This is only problematic for Watzl, here, given that this is precisely what Block claims to establish.
As already noted (see fn. 24 and 25, above), though the details and outcomes differ, Prettyman (2019), and Hill (2016) pursue superficially similar routes to Watzl’s. The results are versions of impure representationalism, wherein, “…phenomenal facts supervene on more than just facts about content.” (Prettyman 2017a).
Ultimately, however, Hill argues that his ‘Thouless hypothesis” not only can but should encompass the specifics of this response.
Hill does criticize Block’s account on other grounds, but examining them, here, will take us too far afield. And, as I argue below, it’s not necessary for our aims.
It’s just this concern, of course, that counts against any of Watzl’s purported perceptual states – all of which are supposed to be illusory – from being representational
A little later, Hill does tentatively suggest some reasons for thinking that his account should be preferred over Block’s, but again, we need not pursue them in order to make our point.
These insights, of course, were also noted by Carrasco et al., and Block, in their own ways, of course. See §5, above
Although, see §4 for an argument that Block has already potentially undermined the scope of his own argument.
My claim, here, is specifically related to Block’s ‘no illusion’ argument.
Arguably, along with the non-selective example of attention – the Tse illusion – §4, above.
Block acknowledges that the image was originally used for another purpose, but nothing hangs on this for either of our ends.
Block claims that if his arguments against direct realism and representationalism are correct, then we have to accept the existence of mental paint. I have ignored the latter point, throughout, preferring instead to focus on the antecedent of this claim.
As discussed in §2, 3, and 4, above.
Due to the, “…the joint effect of amplifying some representations and suppressing others, some things that could be seen, are not seen.” Block (2010, p.31).
Again, see §4, for details.
And, as I suggested in §4, arguably not even in all cases of non-selective attention, either.
I use this term, here, in a non-technical sense. Moreover, I’m remaining neutral about the precise metaphysical nature of this relationship.
Allowing that this argument is consistent with Watzl’s and Hill’s insights is not, of course, the same as saying that one must accept them. I remain neutral between these, and other such representationalist accounts, and provide them as illustrative of potential ways forward, once my additions are taken into account.
That is, as argued above, this position is consonant with the possibility that some perception is unattended.
Some cases of non-selective attention, that is. See §4 for details.
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Hine, R. Block’s Paradox?. Rev.Phil.Psych. 14, 1405–1419 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00652-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00652-y