Skip to main content
Log in

The analytics of continuing conflict

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

The efforts of men are utilized in two different ways: they are directed to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by others.

Vilfredo Pareto

Abstract

Individuals, groups, or nations — if rational and self-interested — will be balancing on the margin between two alternative ways of generating income: (1) “peaceful” production and exchange, versus (2) ‘appropriative” efforts designed to seize resources previously controlled by others (or to defend against such invasions). Both production and appropriation, on the assumption here, are entirely normal lines of activity engaged in to the extent that doing so seems profitable.

The general-equilibrium steady-state model involves a resource partition function, a social production function, a combat power function, and an income distribution equation. Solutions were obtained under thesymmetrical Cournot protocol and two alternativeasymmetrical assumptions: the familiar Stackelberg condition and a more novel hierarchical protocol called Threat-and-Promise. The analysis demonstrates that, in contrast with the harmonistic bias of orthodox economic theory, a general-equilibrium model can also encompass the hostile and destructive interactions that characterize real-world social relations.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Ashenfelter, Orley A. and George E. Johnson: 1969, ‘Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity’,American Economic Review 59, 35–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S.: 1983, ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’,Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bernholz, Peter: 1985,The International Game of Power, Mouton Publishers, Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blainey, Geoffrey: 1973,The Causes of War, The Free Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brackney, Howard: 1959, ‘The Dynamics of Military Combat’,Operations Research 7, 30–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brams, Steven J.: 1977, ‘Deception in 2×2 Games’,Journal of Peace Science 2, 171–203.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bresnahan, Timothy F.: 1981, ‘Duopoly Models with Consistent Conjectures’,American Economic Review 71, 934–945.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brito, Dagobert L. and Michael D. Intriligator: 1985, ‘Conflict, War, and Redistribution’,American Political Science Review 79, 943–957.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. M., R. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock (eds.): 1980,Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society Texas A&M Press, College Station, TX.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce: 1981,The War Trap, Yale University Press, New Haven.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clausewitz, Carl V.: 1984,On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (trans.), indexed edition, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. (Original German edition, 1832.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Danielsen, Albert L.: 1975, ‘A Theory of Exchange, Philanthropy and Appropriation’,Public Choice 24, 13–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert, Felix: 1943, ‘Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War’, in Edward Mead Earle (ed.),Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould, John P.: 1973, ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’,Journal of Legal Studies 2, 279–301.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helmbold, R. L.: 1969, ‘Probability of Victory in Land Combat as Related to Force Ratio’, P-4199, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirshleifer, Jack: 1977, ‘Shakespeare vs. Becker on Altruism: The Importance of Having the Last Word’,Journal of Economic Literature 15, 500–502.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirshleifer, Jack: 1987, ‘The Economic Approach to Conflict’, in G. Radnitzky and P. Bernholz (eds.),Economic Imperialism, Paragon House Publishers, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirshleifer, Jack: 1987, ‘On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises’, in John Dupré (ed.),The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, Herman: 1961,On Thermonuclear War, 2nd ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lanchester, Frederick William: 1916,Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm, Constable, London. Extract reprinted in James R. Newman (ed.): 1956,The World of Mathematics, Vol. 4, Simon and Schuster, New York, pp. 2138–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGuire, Martin C.: 1967, ‘The Structure of Choice Between Deterrence and Defense’, in Roland N. McKean (ed.),Issues in Defense Economics, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Priest, George L. and Benjamin Klein: 1984, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’,Journal of Legal Studies 13, 1–55.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, Thomas C.: 1960,The Strategy of Conflict, Oxford University Press, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shubik, Martin (ed.): 1983,Mathematics of Conflict, North-Holland, Amsterdam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Skogh, Goran and Charles Stuart: 1982, ‘A Contractarian Theory of Property Rights and Crime’,Scandinavian Journal of Economics 84, 27–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, James G.: 1981,Force-on-Force Attrition Modelling, Military Applications Section, Operations Research Society of America, Arlington, VA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thompson, Earl A. and Roger L. Faith: 1981, ‘A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions’,American Economic Review 71, 366–380.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, Gordon: 1974,The Social Dilemma, University Publications, Blacksburg, VA.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, Gordon: 1980, ‘Efficient Rent Seeking’, in J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison, and G. Tullock (eds.),Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittman, Donald: 1979, ‘How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach’,Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, 743–763.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

I thank the Ford Foundation for assistance in supporting this research.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hirshleifer, J. The analytics of continuing conflict. Synthese 76, 201–233 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869589

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869589

Keywords

Navigation