Abstract
According to finite frequentism, the probability of an attribute A in a finite reference class B is the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A within B. I present fifteen arguments against this position.
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Hájek, A. “Mises redux” — Redux: Fifteen arguments against finite frequentism. Erkenntnis 45, 209–227 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00276791
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00276791