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Is Moral Theory Harmful in Practice?—Relocating Anti-theory in Contemporary Ethics

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Abstract

In this paper I discuss the viability of the claim that at least some forms of moral theory are harmful for sound moral thought and practice. This claim was put forward by e.g. Elisabeth Anscombe (1981(1958)) and by Annette Baier, Peter Winch, D.Z Phillips and Bernard Williams in the 1970’s–1980’s. To this day aspects of it have found resonance in both post-Wittgensteinian and virtue ethical quarters. The criticism has on one hand contributed to a substantial change and broadening of the scope of analytic moral philosophy. On the other hand it is, at least in its most strongly anti-theoretical formulations, now broadly considered outdated and—to the extent that it is still defended—insensitive to the changes that have occurred within the field in the last 20–30 years. The task of this paper is to relocate the anti-theoretical critique into the field of analytic ethics today.

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  1. University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland

    Nora Hämäläinen

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  1. Nora Hämäläinen
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Correspondence to Nora Hämäläinen.

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Hämäläinen, N. Is Moral Theory Harmful in Practice?—Relocating Anti-theory in Contemporary Ethics. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 12, 539–553 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9141-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9141-7

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