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Self-Help, Moral Philosophy, and the Moral Present

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that the lack of interest, among analytic moral philosophers, in the contingencies of our moral present, produces an impoverished moral philosophy, unable to address the moral problems and quandaries of ordinary people. What is needed to remedy this is a broadening of the scope of the moral philosopher’s thought to include a rich attention to moral phenomena of the present. One such phenomenon, attended to by sociologists and critical journalists over the past few decades, is the contemporary proliferating genre of psychologically oriented self-help literature. I display a range of sociological responses to self-help in order to point out aspects of morality that are made visible in these discussions, whereas they often remain invisible in standard moral philosophy. The aim is not to suggest a specific methodology for including such material into philosophical discussions, but rather to urge philosophers to reconsider the range of materials they attend to in their work, in order to produce a more lively engagement with and understanding of contemporary morality.

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Notes

  1. For two early studies on reader responses to self-help, conducted among white American middle class readers, see Grodin (1991) and Simonds (1992). Both of these studies significantly complicate the reading of self-help as a handmaid of advanced liberal capitalism. Yet, it can be noted that critical or intellectual public discussions on self-help even today tend to focus on the direct contents of self-help literature, and downplay the complexities of readership.

  2. Hacking, though not a moral philosopher in the ordinary sense, does quite extra ordinary excavations of our moral present in this book on memory and personal identity.

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Correspondence to Nora Hämäläinen.

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Hämäläinen, N. Self-Help, Moral Philosophy, and the Moral Present. Hum Stud 39, 289–306 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-015-9371-3

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