Abstract
Eric Olson and Ned Markosian have, independently, complained that the ways in which the problem of personal identity has been formulated rule out certain views of personal identity just by how the problem is formulated. As a result, both have proposed alternative formulations, each attempting theory neutrality. They have not succeeded, however, since both of their formulations, as well as the formulations that they have rejected, are biased against presentist solutions to the problem, and some are biased against four-dimensionalist solutions, as well as stage theory solutions. In this paper, I show how previous formulations, including Olson’s and Markosian’s, are biased in the ways mentioned, and I propose a list of criteria that any formulation of the problem must meet in order to be theory neutral. Finally, I attempt a formulation that is neutral.
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Notes
Joseph made this suggestion to me in conversation.
See Olson (1997, ch. 2, esp. p. 41). Olson’s formulation is not exactly like (F2), but I take it that (F2) captures what he suggests.
The only difference between the two accounts, which is significant, but irrelevant to my complaint, is that in (F2) “something” is replacing the second instance of “person” in (F1).
Or, if one prefers a tenseless statement of eternalism, one could think of it as the view that quantifying unrestrictedly, it is always the case that for every x, x is before, simultaneous with, or after some specific time. And, of course, presentism and eternalism are not the only alternatives. At least one other is the growing universe theory, according to which, quantifying unrestrictedly, for every x, x is past or x is present.
More exactly, an object x is four-dimensional iff for some y and z, y and z are proper parts of x, and there is temporal distance between y and z.
More exactly, an object x is three-dimensional iff for any y and z, if y and z are parts of x, then there is no temporal distance between y and z. For more on the notion of being wholly present, see Crisp and Smith (2005).
Very similar remarks would be made about (F2), except that the 4Der would say of the “something” in (F2), rather than the second instance of “person” in (F1), that it refers to a temporal part of a temporally extended object which has an earlier or later temporal part that is a person-like thing. But, that earlier or later person-like thing is numerically distinct from the something later or earlier, both of which are a temporal parts of the same temporally extended object.
Shoemaker (1984, pp. 74–75).
Markosian (2010, p. 138).
Ibid, fn 12.
Ibid, p. 137.
Thanks to Joseph Baltimore for pointing this out to me.
See Crisp (2005) for one way a presentist can handle cross-time relations.
The relation may be psychological continuity or bodily continuity, or something other relation. For further discussion, see Sider (1996).
References
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to the audience at the first annual Society for the Metaphysics of Science conference, and especially to Joseph Baltimore, for helpful discussion on an earlier draft of this paper, which I presented at the conference. And I would like to thank Christopher Scott Sevier and David Snyder for reading the paper and giving me helpful feedback on it.
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Hochstetter, K. How to formulate the problem of personal identity. Philos Stud 174, 2125–2136 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0791-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0791-3