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Hegel and Durkheim: Contours of an Elective Affinity

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Durkheim & Critique

Abstract

The aim of my contribution is to outline three points of overlap between Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Durkheim’s sociology of morality in their respective views on social ethics: I will start by characterizing their shared conviction that the foundation of any form of morality cannot be found in some abstract principles but in actually existing, institutionalized normative rules that inform us about our role-obligations (i). In the second step I will show that Hegel and Durkheim also share the social-theoretical conviction that we should differentiate modern societies into three different spheres (family—civil society/market—state) all entailing different sorts of role-obligations; a part of this step will also specifically deal with the question of how both thinkers conceive of the problems raised by the modern, capitalist market economy (ii). In the third part of my contribution I will consider the question of whether we find in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right a placeholder for what Durkheim refers to as a kind of cosmopolitan ethics, a standpoint beyond the role-obligations connected to membership in individual states (iii). In my conclusion I will raise the question of the relevance of Hegel’s and Durkheim’s shared views on the basis for social ethics for contemporary discussions in political and social philosophy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hegel’s name appears only once in Steven Lukes’ exemplary intellectual biography—and moreover in a negative context: S. Lukes Émile Durkheim. His Life and Work, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1985, p. 270.

  2. 2.

    É. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, London, Routledge, [1950] 2018.

  3. 3.

    On the history, significance, and reception of this text, see H-P. Müller, “Die Moralökologie moderner Gesellschaften. Durkheims ‘Physik der Sitten und des Rechts’”, in É. Durkheim, Physik der Sitten und der Moral. Vorlesungen zur Soziologie der Moral, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1999, pp. 307–342.

  4. 4.

    I. Strenski, “Durkheim, Hamelin and the ‘French Hegel’”, Historical Reflections/Reflections Historiques, Vol. 16, 2/3, 1989, pp. 135–170.

  5. 5.

    See especially: P. Knapp, “The Question of Hegelian Influence upon Durkheim’s Sociology”, Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 55, 1, 1985, pp. 1–15; S. Gangas, “Social Ethic and Logic: Rethinking Durkheim through Hegel”, Journal of Classical Sociology, Vol. 7, 3, 2007, pp. 315–338; S. Gangas, “Hegel and Durkheim: Sittlichkeit and Organic Solidarity as Political Configurations”, Hegel-Jahrbuch, 2009, 1, pp. 222–226.

  6. 6.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, §§483–486, pp. 217–218.

  7. 7.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, cit., §§483, pp. 217–218.

  8. 8.

    The famous formula from the Phenomenology of Spirit reads “I that is we and the we that is I”, G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 108.

  9. 9.

    É. Durkheim, “Individual and Collective Representations”, Sociology and Philosophy, London, Routledge, [1924] 2010, pp. 1–16. Adorno’s introduction to the German translation has not proved especially useful to Durkheim’s reception in the German-speaking world, because he rather sweepingly assigns Durkheim to the positivist tradition and accuses him of conservatism—which, given his sympathies for certain currents of socialism, is most unjust. See T. W. Adorno, “Einleitung”, É. Durkheim, Soziologie und Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1976, pp. 7–44.

  10. 10.

    É. Durkheim, “Individual and Collective Representations”, cit., p. 10.

  11. 11.

    É. Durkheim, “Individual and Collective Representations”, cit., p. 11.

  12. 12.

    For an account of we-intentionality, which includes critical (though marginal) remarks on Durkheim and omits Hegel entirely, see H. B. Schmid, Wir-Intentionalität. Kritik des ontologischen Individualismus und Rekonstruktion der Gemeinschaft, Freiburg/München, Verlag Karl Alber, 2005.

  13. 13.

    G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, §147, p. 191. In this passage Hegel speaks directly of an “insight grounded on reasons” to which trust in a given form of ethical life has to be bound. On the entire complex of problems bearing on the relation between ethical life, habit, and reflexive consent, see A. Novakovic, Hegel on Second Nature in Ethical Life, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, chap. 3, pp. 106–160.

  14. 14.

    On this point, see A. Särkelä, Immanente Kritik und soziales Leben. Selbsttransformative Praxis nach Hegel und Dewey, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 2018, chap. III, pp. 75–138.

  15. 15.

    É. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, Glencoe, Free Press, [1893] 1960, pp. 171–173.

  16. 16.

    É. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, cit., p. 172.

  17. 17.

    Interestingly, one can identify significant overlaps with Rousseau at this point: Rousseau too tends to describe the entry of the isolated subject into society, and thus the reshaping of their individual will into the general will (“volonté general”), as an abrupt process, which bears more of the traits of a conversion than that of a reflective appropriation: J.-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Political Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, I, 6, pp. 49–51. On the influence of Rousseau’s philosophy on Durkheim’s thought, see S. Lukes, Émile Durkheim. His Life and Work, cit., pp. 125–128.

  18. 18.

    É. Durkheim, “Individual and collective representations”, cit., p.15. Hans Joas also pointed out Durkheim’s tendency to deprive the subject of the possibility of an individual interpretation of collective consciousness: H. Joas, The Genesis of Values, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2000, p. 68.

  19. 19.

    É. Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, cit., p. 228.

  20. 20.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, cit., pp. 347–356.

  21. 21.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §138(H), pp. 166–167.

  22. 22.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §151, p. 195.

  23. 23.

    É. Durkheim, “The Determination of Moral Facts”, Sociology and Philosophy, cit., pp. 16–32.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., 20. This ontological thesis, according to which norms form components of social reality, is one that Hegel could have endorsed; not, pace Durkheim, because of the observability of such norms, but on account of their social efficacy.

  25. 25.

    É. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, cit., p. 2.

  26. 26.

    É. Durkheim, “The Determination of Moral Facts”, cit., p. 17.

  27. 27.

    É. Durkheim, Moral Education. A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of Education, New York, The Free Press, [1925] 1973, pp. 108–111.

  28. 28.

    É. Durkheim, “The Determination of Moral Facts”, cit., pp. 20–21.

  29. 29.

    Ivi.

  30. 30.

    Though, strangely enough, he neglects to mention it in his introduction. See T. W. Adorno, “Einleitung”, cit. p. 9.

  31. 31.

    Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit. §157, pp. 197–198.

  32. 32.

    Ivi.

  33. 33.

    Ivi. Here, Hegel provides an overview of his three ethical spheres.

  34. 34.

    Émile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, cit. In his lectures, Durkheim distinguishes between the moralities of the family, of the professional, and of the citizen. His lectures on the morality of the family have been lost, however.

  35. 35.

    É. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, cit., see especially, chap. 6, pp. 174ff.

  36. 36.

    In his chapter in “civil society”, Hegel is largely indebted to Adam Smith, who himself saw the advantages of the new, market-based economy in its enabling of individual freedom and independence. See A. Smith, An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977, p. 142.

  37. 37.

    Durkheim articulates this theory with considerable clarity in his study of the division of labor: É. Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, cit., I, chap. 6, p. 174ff.

  38. 38.

    G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., I–II, pp. 65–186.

  39. 39.

    These Hegelian characterizations of “right” and “morality” play a foundational role in my Freedom’s Right: A. Honneth, Freedom’s Right. The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, New York, Columbia University Press, 2014.

  40. 40.

    This is especially clear at É. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, cit., p. 3.

  41. 41.

    Ivi.

  42. 42.

    One reading of the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, however, says that he regards such universal duties as the moral dowry of commercial transaction in the market place; the passage which might support such an interpretation is G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §190, pp. 228–229. On this, see T. Heisenberg, “Hegel on the value of the market economy”, European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 26/4, 2018, pp. 1283–1296.

  43. 43.

    On this, see L. Carré, “Die Sozialpathologie der Moderne – Durkheim und Hegel im Vergleich”, Hegel-Jahrbuch, 2013, 1, pp. 318–323.

  44. 44.

    I have tried to demonstrate the centrality of the society-organism analogy to the idea that there is such a thing as social pathologies in A. Honneth “Die Krankheiten der Gesellschaft. Annäherungen an einen nahezu unmöglichen Begriff”, Die Armut unserer Freiheit. Aufsätze 2012–2019, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 2020, pp. 165–186. This thought has since been developed in more detail by Frederick Neuhouser, who also draws on Hegel and Durkheim. Most of these manuscripts remain unpublished, though for a representative example see F. Neuhouser, “Geistige Gesundheit und kulturelle Pathologie bei Nietzsche”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 68, 1, pp. 1–27.

  45. 45.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §256A, pp. 273–273.

  46. 46.

    D. Rüschemeyer, “Spencer und Durkheim über Arbeitsteilung und Differenzierung: Kontinuität oder Bruch?”, N. Luhmann, Soziale Differenzierung. Zur Geschichte einer Idee, Wiesbaden, Springer, 1985, pp. 163–180.

  47. 47.

    I have attempted to give an interpretation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in terms of a diagnosis of such social pathologies —albeit without making any use of the organism analogy—in A. Honneth, The Pathologies of Individual Freedom. Hegel’s Social Theory, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010, chap. II, pp. 25–47. I was very much guided by Hegel’s diagnostic method in A. Honneth, Freedom’s Right, cit.

  48. 48.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §163, pp. 202–203.

  49. 49.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §185, pp. 222–223.

  50. 50.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §§182–187, pp. 220–226.

  51. 51.

    É. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, cit., p. 12.

  52. 52.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §§252–256, pp. 270–274.

  53. 53.

    G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, cit., §255, p. 273.

  54. 54.

    É. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, p. 16. On the relation between Hegel’s corporations and Durkheim’s professional associations, see H. Delitz, “Durkheims Hegel. Von Korporationen zu kollektiven Affekten, vom Soziozentrismus zum Postfundationalismus”, S. Ellmers, S. Herrmann (ed.), Korporation und Sittlichkeit. Zur Aktualität von Hegels Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Paderborn, Wilhelm Fink, 2017, pp. 45–72. On the issues surrounding Durkheim’s economic sociology, see the important study: J. Beckert, Grenzen des Marktes. Die sozialen Grundlagen wirtschaftlicher Effizienz, Frankfurt/New York, Campus, 1997, chap. 2, pp. 103–188.

  55. 55.

    É. Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, cit., III, pp. 353–410.

  56. 56.

    É. Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, cit., pp. 171–173. But see too, É. Durkheim, “Individualism and the Intellectuals”, Émile Durkheim on Morality and Society, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, [1898] 1973, pp. 43–88.

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Honneth, A. (2021). Hegel and Durkheim: Contours of an Elective Affinity. In: Marcucci, N. (eds) Durkheim & Critique. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75158-6_2

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