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Notes
Byrne and Logue (2009, p. x). On their taxonomy, the moderate view is distinct from both disjunctivism and conjunctivism.
As Overgaard rightly points out, McDowell does not endorse the relational view as understood here, and so it was odd to lump a discussion of his view in with the relational view, as I do in Sect. 6.2 of PK. Nevertheless, the view that I attribute to McDowell, weird object disjunctivism—the view that hallucinations successfully reveal non-worldly or “weird” intentional objects such as appearances—is one way of developing either a content view like McDowell’s or a relational view such as Brewer’s or Campbell’s. I was, in short, discussing McDowell qua advocate of the weird-object view.
Millar (2007) interprets McDowell’s argument along similar lines.
See Overgaard, p. 58: “I find it hard to believe that clever people like John Campbell, Michael Martin, and John McDowell should have overlooked the fact that when I see a coffee mug, say, there are always aspects (rear side, innards, etc.) of it that are not strictly presented.” That, however, is very different from recognizing that this inadequacy is part of the very phenomenology of the experience. Similarly, we probably all agree that there are better and worse conditions under which to view physical objects, but not everyone thereby endorses a view such as Sean Kelly’s (2010), according to which this normativity is built right into the content of perception.
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Hopp, W. Replies. Husserl Stud 29, 65–77 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-013-9126-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-013-9126-9