Abstract
Kyburg’s opposition to the subjective Bayesian theory, and in particular to its advocates’ indiscriminate and often questionable use of Dutch Book arguments, is documented and much of it strongly endorsed. However, it is argued that an alternative version, proposed by both de Finetti at various times during his long career, and by Ramsey, is less vulnerable to Kyburg’s misgivings. This is a logical interpretation of the formalism, one which, it is argued, is both more natural and also avoids other, widely-made objections to Bayesianism.
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Howson, C. Modelling uncertain inference. Synthese 186, 475–492 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9995-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9995-4