Abstract
At several points in his writings, Levinas is implicitly critical of Hobbes's view that the political order is required to restrict violent conflict and competition and make morality possible. This paper makes Levinas's criticisms explicit by comparing Hobbes's descriptions of human nature and human relations with Levinas's radically different descriptions of the ethical relation of responsibility and the consequent kinship of the human community. I use insights from Levinas to argue that ethics cannot be reduced to politics and that the primacy of the ethical relation provides a more adequate description of human relations and justice in the human community.
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Hughes, C.L. The primacy of ethics: Hobbes and Levinas. Continental Philosophy Review 31, 79–94 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010089805428
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010089805428