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Two-Dimensional Adventures

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Abstract

This paper recalls some applications of two-dimensional modal logic from the 1980s, including work on the logic of ‘Actually’ and on a somewhat idealized version of the indicative/subjunctive distinction, as well as on absolute and relative necessity. There is some discussion of reactions this material has aroused in commentators since. We also survey related work by Leslie Tharp from roughly the same period.

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Humberstone, L. Two-Dimensional Adventures. Philosophical Studies 118, 17–65 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019542.43440.d1

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