Abstract
I challenge the adequacy of David Brink’s “master principle” of culpability. I allege that it fails to account for the moral relevance of ignorance of wrongdoing. I describe three cases in which I believe that Brink’s theory of normative competence cannot account for the significance of a variable that bears on culpability. In most of this paper I attempt to anticipate and reply to the various responses Brink might offer to my challenge.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Kim Ferzan for helping me to avoid errors in a previous draft of this essay.
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Husak, D. Is Fair Opportunity a Comprehensive Theory of Responsibility?. Criminal Law, Philosophy (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09676-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09676-6