Abstract
Recently there has been some interest in studying the explanation of meaning by using signaling games. I shall argue that the meaning of signals in signaling games remains sufficiently unclear to motivate further investigation. In particular, the possibility of distinguishing imperatives and indicatives at a fundamental level will be explored. Thereby I am trying to preserve the generality of the signaling games framework while bringing it closer to human languages. A number of convergence results for the evolutionary dynamics of our models will be proved.
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Acknowledgements
The paper profited most from discussions with Brian Skyrms and Bill Harms. Moreover, I am grateful to Peter Hurd, Natasha Komarova, Don Saari and Kevin Zollman for their assistance, and to an anonymous referee for a number of useful suggestions.
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Huttegger, S.M. Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives. Erkenntnis 66, 409–436 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9022-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9022-1